Summary: The Lebanese Political System has been long associated with a consociational model of democracy, which Ardent Lijphart uses as a synonym to a Power-Sharing model. The National Pact of 1943 was an interim measure to overcome the divisions between Christian and Muslim leaders at the time of independence. It was hoped that eventually as the national spirit grew, the importance of confessionalism in the political structure would diminish. This so called temporary solution, however, due to its sensitivities of the population structure, was followed with a permanent effect. The Taif Accord of 1989 was a revision to that. This paper tries to revisit the Taif Accord, its stipulations, and study the changes as well as the problems associated with the same in the Lebanese society. It then tries to investigate if there has been any real reform to the Lebanese Political system, or is it just another modification to the same existing consociational model, of religious confessionalism.
INTRODUCTION
Till 1918, Lebanon was under the administrative rule and political sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. In 1920, the territory defined by the present-day boundaries became a state called “Grand – Liban” (Great Lebanon). This greater Lebanon included a mosaic of minorities, where the Maronites, the Sunni and the Shi’a sect of Islam formed the larger section within the existing communities. The state remained under French Mandate until November 26, 1941. A constitution was formally adopted on May 25, 1926 establishing a democratic republic with a parliamentary system of government. Effective political independence of the Republic occurred on November 22, 1943 (its Independence Day). In 1945 Lebanon became a founding member of the League of Arab states, and then it became a member of the United Nations.
Regarding its population structure, the last census that officially took place was in the year of 1932. Since the confessional system in place situated for political power sharing on the basis on population strength, it was natural that any change in the status quo as originated was met with strong protest from the communities at risk. In effect, today, we only arrive at unofficial ‘guess’ estimates regarding the present composition of population. The National pact of 1943 divided the seats according to the ratio of 6:5 in the parliament between the Christian and the Islamic sects. Lebanon acknowledges seventeen confessional groups, who are usually rendered political power in approximated percentages. Further, the President is to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister from the Sunni community, and the position of the Speaker would go to a Shi’a. Traditionally, the Deputy Speaker has always been a Greek Orthodox.
Another unique feature of this political system was the compromise they had reached between the indigenous Christian identities with that of the prevailing Arab-Islamic identity prevalent in the region. The Maronites and the other Christians volunteered to distance themselves from the western identification and accept the Arab face provided the Islamic sects in the state do the same. Needless to say, this remains a very sensitive issue as any closeness towards one or the other leads to the prevalence of a feeling of insecurity among the population. The first civil war is often interpreted as a reaction to Chamoun’s closeness with the western and French identification, which created a sense of insecurity among others.
A critical problem arose in its already sensitive population structure in the issue of immigration and absorption of refugees. The Armenian Massacre resulted in influx of Armenian Orthodox in the Lebanese society which was favourable to the existing Christian population there. However, the influx of the Palestinian Refugees, resultant of the wars with Israel, specifically the 1948 and 1967 wars, added with the Black September incident of 1970, caused for increasing Islamic population in the state. In such a situation, unlike Jordanians, these refugees were not incorporated unlike the erstwhile situation with the Armenians. Such intricacies cause for immense dissatisfaction throughout the Lebanese society. The Sunni’s and the Shi’a also claim that in time, there population has increased the 1932 census estimates and they actually form the political majority. In effect, they demanded the revision of the 6:5 ratios in Parliament. The Taif Accord was a revision to that effect, and today, the seats are divided equally among these two major communities. Still, the Islamic population remains dissatisfied asserting their claims which the Maronites and the Christian communities promptly decline to entertain.
THE CIVIL WARS IN LEBANON; THE ASSOCIATED POLITICAL BACKGOUND
Lebanon has seen a series of crisis and has been attributed with a longest running civil war. During the initial years of the Lebanese state, many saw it in the western face of the Arab world. Mercantile progress was however characterized by uneven development. While the urban location developed in leaps and bounds, the rural areas, mainly the Shi’a areas, remained undeveloped. The lopsided development was added with inefficient and crowded civic planning, where houses were built for the haves, while not much concern was relegated to the have-nots of the society. This disparity remained looming large.
The 1958 crisis was a relatively smaller one. One of the reasons for its eruption was the gradual disassociation by the ruler of the National Pact. Chamoun had always made a personal close association with the west while was not shy in expressing his displeasures at the Arab or the Islamic identification of the country. It was mainly caused by political and religious tensions in the country. It included a U.S. military intervention, leading to the easing of tensions. The civil war however, extended over a longer time frame. The scholars give varied reasons trying to explain the causation. Of few of the causes cited are the militarization of the Palestinian refugee population, with the arrival of the PLO guerrilla forces did spark an arms race amongst the different Lebanese political factions. In addition, the political ambitions of the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, who used the Palestinian cause to disrupt consensus amongst different Lebanese factions also contributed to the general chaos. Apart from the presence of the Palestinians, the stress caused by the confessional model power sharing was also a factor in the system collapse of the Lebanese society.
During the 1960s Lebanon was relatively calm. In the meanwhile, Fatah and other Palestinians groups had attempted to mount a coup in Jordan by incentivizing a split in the Jordanian army. The Jordanians responded and expelled the forces into Lebanon. This resulted in additional ‘armed’ Palestinian population in Lebanon. The Lebanese Sunni Muslims showed solidarity to the Palestinians, with the aim to change the political system from one of consensus amongst different ethnicities, towards one where their power share would increase. The Shi’a on the sidelines claimed there population has surpassed both the Sunni’s and the Maronites, demanding a revision in the National Pact. Among other incidents, the Sabra and Shatila Massacre resulted in the formation of Hezbollah, the Shi’a face of the Lebanese society with military affiliations and strong external linkages. The external actors like Syria and Iraq played havoc in the already trembling situation.
Between 1985 and 1989, sectarian conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Rashid Karami, head of a government of national unity set up after the failed peace efforts of 1984, was assassinated on June 1987. President Gemayel, before stepping down, appointed another Maronite Christian, Michel Aoun, as acting Prime Minister, contravening the National Pact. Muslim groups naturally rejected the violation of the National Pact and pledged support to Selim al-Hoss, a Sunni who had succeeded Karami. Lebanon was thus divided between a Christian military government in East Beirut and a civilian government in West Beirut.
The cause of the Lebanese civil war was neither exclusively internal nor exclusively external, nor is its settlement. The civil war came to an end at a specific historical juncture when movement toward internal reconciliation coincided with favourable regional and international developments. The Taif Agreement of 1989 brought the civil war into the process towards an end. In January of that year, Arab League formed a committee to formulate solutions to the conflict. This led to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Taif, Saudi Arabia, where they agreed to the national reconciliation accord in October. The agreement provided a large role for Syria in Lebanese affairs. Accordingly, in March 1991, parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. It was, however, not extended to crimes perpetrated against foreign diplomats or certain crimes referred by the cabinet to the Higher Judicial Council. In May 1991, the militias (with the important exception of Hezbollah) were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild themselves as Lebanon's only major non-sectarian institution.
THE NATIONAL PACT OF 1943: ITS LIMITATIONS
The National Pact of 1943 was an unwritten agreement that laid the foundation of Lebanon as a multi-confessional state, where negotiations between the Shi’a, Sunni and Maronite leaderships took shape to finally allowing Lebanon to have an independent existence. It was basically between President Bishara al-Khuri and Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh involving two major groupings: the political elite of the Maronites representing the Christians in general and the political elite of the Sunnis representing the Muslims. Among its provisions were the demands that the Maronites not to seek foreign intervention and accept Lebanon as an Arab affiliated country, instead of a Western one if the Muslims give up their aspirations to unite with Syria. The president would always be from the Maronite community, the Prime Minister a Sunni, while the speaker of the parliament would traditionally be a Shi’a. Also, added to these negotiated agreements, the seats of the National Parliament was to be divided in a ratio of 6:5, reflecting the census of 1932, along the confessional lines.
The constitution gave the Maronite president ultimate executive authority while not providing a mechanism for presidential accountability, especially since parliament could question the cabinet, but not the president. Moreover, in addition to the presidency, other key positions in government were held by Maronites. Members of this sect were to occupy major positions in key ministries, in the army and in the courts. Such positions included the commander-in-chief of the army, the highest Judicial position (President of the Court of Cassation), the positions of the Director-General of both internal security and intelligence and that of Governor of the Central Bank.
The confessional system's self-sustainability faces a problem in trying to give all religious groups proportional rights, but with incentives for national unity, because it assumes that citizens will always take sides with their confessional community. On this count, there are three main issues: reform of the political system, a national identity for Lebanon, and Lebanon's sovereignty. These are interdependent concept: Lebanon's sovereignty hinges on the whims of Damascus, national identity was shattered by civil war, and the confessional system created quotas for religious representation, failing to reflect the real change of religious ratios in the population bred volatility, frustrating the political majorities, who fear a reduction in their power, and the popular majorities, who want and demand for more political power.
THE TAIF ACCORD: ITS CHARACTERISTICS
The Taif Agreement, also known as the "National Reconciliation Accord” was an agreement reached to provide the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon. It was negotiated in Taif, Saudi Arabia by the surviving members of Lebanon's 1972 parliament, with its agreement covering political reform, the ending of the Civil War, the establishment of special relations between Lebanon and Syria, and a framework for the beginning of complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. This Accord restructured the political system in Lebanon by transferring some of the power away from the Maronite Christian community.
It was a compromise among the Lebanese deputies, political groups and parties, militias and leaders, tackling many essential points pertaining to the structure of the political system and to the sovereignty of the Lebanese state. The mechanism for regaining state sovereignty was preceded by an affirmation of the identity and unity of Lebanon. It was also preceded by internal political, administrative and other reforms. The Taif Agreement was a package deal. It constituted the right formula to end the war internally; however it was merely a process, not the end. In the Lebanese case one could not totally separate the internal aspects of the conflict from its regional dimensions. Consequently, the best solution was to preserve Lebanon as an entity and to introduce a new political and practical formula that would stop the war. This formula would also allow the Lebanese to regain a minimal degree of stability in order to rebuild their institutions, resuscitate their economy, and reinforce their capacity to face changing regional and international conditions.
As far as this Agreement was concerned, it was decisive in determining the Arab identity of Lebanon, emphasizing that Lebanon was an independent, sovereign, free country and a "final homeland" for all Lebanese. It, therefore, tried to uphold the national identity over communal leanings. This has been the initial goal of the National Pact, but with no success. Secondly, related to the previous point, it confirmed the unity of Lebanon.
Thirdly, it defined the nation's political system as a parliamentary democracy, based on the principles of separation, balance, and cooperation among the various branches of government. The Prime Minister, who was previously responsible to the Maronite President, was now responsible to the parliament. This would bring accountability in the government as well as help in reduce the political importance and power of the President, who being a Maronite, caused for domestic tensions among the other confessional groups in the Lebanese political system.
Fourth, it clearly defined the socio-economic system as a free economy favouring individual initiative and the right to private property. However, it also emphasized the necessity for balanced and even development in all the regions to insure a form of social equity. This was a commendable measure as in the previous years; the lopsided economic growth and development in society had resulted in wide disparity among its population composition. The Shi’a, for example, usually the rural-less economically developed class, suffered in the negative in such existing disparity, with no grievance mechanism from the central authority.
Fifth, its aim was at restoring the Lebanese sovereignty. It called for the disbandment of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and handling over their weapons to the Lebanese state within six months. Simultaneously, it called for the strengthening of the military and the Lebanese internal security forces. It also stated that the abolition of political sectarianism constitutes a basic national goal to be achieved according to a gradual scheme. The army, for instance, was modelled into a secular institution.
THE POST-TAIF LEBANON AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT
At the time of negotiations at Taif, Saudi Arabia, a Maronite Christian, General Michel Aoun, had controversially been appointed by President Amine Gemayel as the Prime Minister, which was contrary to the set agreement traditionally followed under the National Pact. The Taif Agreement, as mentioned before while discussing its characteristic features, identified the abolition of political sectarianism as a national priority. However, it provided no timeframe for doing so. It was, in effect, a sort of open-ended provision The Chamber of Deputies was increased in size to 128 members, shared equally between Christians and Muslims, rather than elected by universal suffrage that would have provided a Muslim majority . A cabinet was established similarly divided equally between Christians and Muslims. The Prime Minister Michel Aoun refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Taif Accord, as he feared the dominance of Syria in its domestic affairs as a result. But under the President Elias Hraowi, the Taif regime in Lebanon was in place.
As far as the agreement is concerned, it basically left few issues out in the open to be deliberated upon in the future. One relates to the process of re- establishment of complete sovereignty in Lebanon. It was post this Accord when Lebanon joined the Madrid Peace Conference and later the bilateral negotiations with Israel. A related issue to this was the presence of the Syrian Troops, invited by the Lebanese government to restore peace and stability within its borders. This was, inspite of domestic opposition within Lebanon to such provisions, also a rationale the Israeli’s used to refuse to withdraw postponed a Syrian troop redeployment which had been written into the Taif Agreement. It was only in May 2000 when under the international ceasefire and legalities, Israel withdrew from the southern borders in accordance with the United Nations.
The larger issue was that of the nature of the internal political reforms and their implementation. The Taif Agreement introduced thirty-one important constitutional amendments which were approved by the Lebanese Parliament on August 21, 1990, and signed into law by President Elias al-Hraoui on September 21, 1990. While these reforms did not fundamentally alter the political structure , this Taif Agreement Implicitly ratified the National Pact of 1943 and emphasizes confessional compromise and inter-communal cooperation aiming at creating a new and more equitable confessional formula.
In the initial years of the implementation of the Agreement, the Lebanese agreed on the necessity of state revival, but they disagreed on the model that they should adopt. The Taif accord was a beacon to them, to reach some sort interim agreement so that it may be developed on and built upon on a later date. There was lot of internal debates, few of them till dare, on whether it had to be the traditional liberal model which existed before the war, the strong-state model, or a new model that would provide for both a sharing and concentration of power? This debate and contemplation has resulted in innumerable opinions and options, which are reflected far and wide on only in academia, but also in Opinion Pages of newspapers. The Agreement resulted in a reproduction of the Lebanese confessional state under a new formula. Sectarian balance and sectarian participation replaced one-sect hegemony, thus power became distributed centrally.
At the state level, the Agreement produced a troika consisting of the three Presidents: the President of the Republic, that of the Council of Ministers, and that of the Parliament. In practice, the understanding among these three presidents as individuals has come to mean that the three institutions, qua institutions, have paled in importance. This contradicts the fundamental purpose of the Agreement which was to replace the rule of the individual (the President) by the rule of the institutions. Furthermore, many different interpretations of the way to implement the Agreement have emerged. These differences result from the attempt of each President, as a representative of his confessional community, to enhance his position and his prerogatives. Moreover, the insistence of the President of the Republic to exercise many of the prerogatives that the Agreement has already cancelled represents an attempt to maintain some common unwritten practices in order to revitalize the old, pre-war system, thus curtailing the intent of the Taif Agreement through different practice. For instance, the insistence of the President of the Republic on attending, and thus presiding, over every meeting of the Council of Ministers in order to assert that he still has control over the executive power.
Yet, the most alarming consequence of the implementation of the Agreement has been the intensification of confessional conflicts and divisions leading to the paralysis of the political and administrative authorities. The disagreement on the appointment of the Grade One public posts has been an indication of such conflict. Wien some of these appointments were declared, they reflected a confessional distribution based on compromises that were based on neither competence nor expertise. The Taif state has not yet been able to establish a clear and relatively stable formula to rule, govern, and exercise authority. In addition to the previously mentioned problems, one can note the lack of new socio-political forces and leadership that can implement the Agreement fully, leading the nation towards a more democratic system.
The Lebanese state in the post-Taif era has been arbitrarily controlled by contradictory and conflicting socio- political forces. On the one hand, the militias that were dominant during the war years were invited and encouraged to participate in the political reformation process because they were considered to be representative of a reality that needs to be acknowledged first and gradually changed later. On the other hand, new socio-political forces foreign to the war forces came into power; they represent the economic power of local capital allied with regional capital, with important support from the rich and conservative Gulf states as well as that of European and American states. At the same time, the influence of the traditional confessional leaders greatly diminished during the war years, and this process continued in the Taif state.
The changes in the Lebanese system cannot be considered as due exclusively to changes of leaders. Exaggerating the role of the individual will not aid in understanding the Lebanese situation fully, neither its effects upon Lebanon's internal and external relations. In fact, an analysis of the new qualitative stage of development in the Taif state is necessary for the understanding of the current situation in Lebanon.
CONCLUSION
The Taif Accord can be blamed at having only reinforced the already existing confessional system, and creating even sharp divisions in society than before. Lebanese leaders were well aware that confessionalism was a major impediment to integration; a pragmatic solution was adopted, and it was hoped that people would unite as they learned to live together. Other provisions of the Taif Accord relating to Lebanon's external relations were more controversial. "Lebanon is Arab in belonging and in identity" is a stronger expression of Lebanon's "Arabness" than it was found in the 1943 National Pact and thus alarming some Christians. Syria was given a privileged position on matters relating to national security, thereby, effectively challenging the sovereignty of Lebanon in matters of independent policy making.
The Lebanese people themselves have come a long way. But the chief dilemma that surrounds their very identify is that of identity itself. Regarding this factor, the chief component in any deeply divided society lies in that, the particularistic identity often prevails over the overarching national identity. Lebanon is no exception. The Taif Accord may have brought the Christians and the Islamic population at the same ratio in the parliament, but the increasing demands by the Shites to have better representation, the Maronites dissatisfaction at losing a major component of power, points to the fact that even though they all belong to the National category of being Lebanese, the particularistic identity prevail as strong as ever. The problem arises when this particularistic identity comes in contradiction with the national one.
Overall, while revisiting the Taif Accord, what one finds ultimately are the same structures of the National Pact being inserted into the new, amidst some modification. The recent developments in Lebanon, not the subject matter concerned in this paper, only establishes the rising political role of the Shi’a and the Sunni, even Druze while a gradual diminishing of importance of the erstwhile Maronite community in the Lebanese Political society. It does not point towards an ultimate eradication of sectarian consciousness among the people. The confessional divisions remain.
END NOTES:
The National Pact of 1943 is an unwritten agreement which came into being in the summer of 1943 as the result of numerous meetings between Khuri (a Maronite), Lebanon's first president, and the first prime minister, Riyad as Sulh a Sunni. [http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/77.htm]
The reason for not incorporating the Palestinian Population is perhaps political. The usual argument amongst the Arab states prevail that this is done basically to capable the refugees to retain their identity as Palestinians and the support they all provide for the cause of the Palestinian State in the future. The Palestinians too, want to retain their national identity and hence do not look for assimilation in a favorable light inspite of stringent political reality.
David C. Gordon in his book ‘Lebanon: the Fragmented Nation ’, 1980, depicts in details the social and political inequality that existed in the Lebanese society during this period.
The Civil War in Lebanon stretched from 1975 and came to an official end only with the Taif Accord of 1989.
It was a conflict between Palestinian guerrilla organizations and King Hussein of Jordan that began in September 1970 and ended in July 1971 with the expulsion of the PLO to Lebanon, also known as ‘The Black September’.
Inspite of a vast literature pointing towards this effect, Mark Farha in his article ‘Democratic Dilemma’s’,
Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis, Edited by Barry Rubin concludes suggesting that the communities—Christians, Sunnis and the Shi’a’ are roughly equivalent.
An amnesty law is any law that retroactively exempts a select group of people, usually military leaders and government leaders, from criminal liability for crimes committed. Most allegations involve human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. In this case, it was the Hezbollah, who subsequently formed part of the Hariri government.
This was an important reform as Lebanon as a modern state has always been divided along sectarian lines, the national spirit always weak. The process of state building was complete, yet weak. The nation building was incomplete. It became a state with many nationalities. The army, previously reflecting that, was ineffective during the Civil War against the armed militia as the religious loyalty was strong. Professional army, non sectarian in basis is required for any society, especially such deeply divided ones like in the case of Lebanon.
The Taif Agreement introduced thirty-one important constitutional amendments which were approved by the Lebanese Parliament on August 21, 1990, and signed into law by President Elias al-Hraoui on September 21, 1990. The reforms did not fundamentally alter the political structure, which is still predicated on political sectarianism.
This however does not include the expatriate community, a majority of which is Christian.
The Syrians took over the Lebanese government apparatuses and brought their own proxies and yes-men to power, including clearly pro-Syrian presidents (Elias Hraowi, followed by Emil Lahoud), prime ministers and even Lebanese parliament deputies. Many held the opinion that Lebanon was slowly being formed into a Syrian Protectorate.
These are mentioned in details in an article by Hassan Krayem, ‘The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement’, American University of Beirut, [http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html] Accessed at 11 Feb 2010, 10:25 a.m.
It is still predicated on political sectarianism, only changing the responsibility of the Prime Minister to the Parliament, which was given few more powers while the powers of the President was reduced to some extend.
The Agreement stated that the abolition of confessionalism was a national goal, however, no specific deadline or time table was provided for its actualization
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