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Monday, 11 April 2011

Changes in the Nature of US intervention in Latin America during the Cold War period and its Aftermath

Introduction:

US intervention in the Latin American Affairs is not a new phenomenon and could be traced back to the 19th century when the Latin American states started emerging as independent entities from their European colonial masters. What was important during this period was that the US itself was emerging as a new state with much less space and resources than it currently possesses. It started with the Monroe Doctrine of December 2, 1823 which propounded the idea of the Western Hemisphere where Latin America was implied to be the backyard of the US. Then it started a process of gradual territorial expansion since the first half of the 19th century through “manifest destiny” which continued till the early 20the century when the consolidated form of the present US emerged. This ideology was further boosted by acts like the Platt Amendment (1901) and Roosevelt Corollary (1904), which acted as boosters to US expansionist policies. Pope Atkins argues that during this period the US were guided by the twin objectives of a) excluding foreign influence from Latin America and b) promoting stability within it. After its consolidation the Mexico and the Circum Caribbean belt was increasingly looked upon by the US as important to its security and well-being with the result that these regions witnessed the largest number of armed US interventions (both direct and indirect) than the Southern Cone.
My enquiry in this paper began with the question as to whether the Nicaraguan Judgement of the ICJ in 1986 had any impact on the nature of US intervention in Latin America. Empirical evidence like the intervention in Panama (1989) and in Haiti (1992), subsequent to the judgement provides a negative response. But my contention is that although the US pulled out of the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the ICJ against the judgement, the verdict did change the nature of intervention in an indirect manner. This change was more perceptible after the democratization process of the 80’s and the 90’s in Latin America and the end of the Cold War which dissolved the ideological enemy before the US, often provided as a pretext to intervene. As the End of Cold War symbolized the superiority of Democratic norms and the US went on a ‘democratic drive’ itself, use of direct military means for intervening in the Latin America became politically incorrect. So increasing recourse was taken to what I would call ‘tension points’ to intervene in democratically elected countries.
This paper has been divided into four sections. The first section deals with the meaning of ‘intervention’ as provided by the UN Charter and also by the Nicaraguan Case (1986). The second gives a brief sketch of some leading US interventions in Latin America which was mostly coercive in nature. The third section discusses the change in the nature of intervention after the Post Cold War and the subsequent democratization process with special reference to tension points. And finally, the fourth would be an attempt at summarizing the debate by providing some critical insights.
1

Article 2 paragraph 4 of the UN Charter states that “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United nations”. Exception to this article is provided only by Article 51 of the Charter which calls for individual or collective self-defence and authorized by the UN Security Council. In the Nicaraguan Case of 1986 the US was caught on the wrong foot when the court “found the USA of breaching provisions of Customary International Law and intervening in the affairs of another state”. The Court further called for reparation to be made for al injuries caused (paragraph 13 of the judgement) and urged the USA to refrain from such acts which constitute a breach of its legal obligations (paragraph 12 of the judgement). This was a damning conviction of a major world power which was supposed to be acting “irresponsibly”. I would use this interpretation of the court to define “intervention” in this paper.
2

During the cold war and its immediate aftermath the US made four direct and many covert interventions in Latin America. Some of the important covert interventions were:
a) Operation P B Success (1953-54)
After his election in the early 50’s, Guatemala’s democratically elected President Arbenz Guzman instituted sweeping land reforms to benefit the country’s vast impoverished populance. As this involved appropriation of large farmland from Multinational companies, including the powerful United Fruits Company, US economic interest suffered which was given a political colour by depicting as intrusion of Communist ideology into the Hemisphere. Eisenhower, then, authorized the CIA to organise a coup which led to Arbenz’s ouster.
b) Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961)
Taking cue from Guatemala, Kennedy authorized the CIA to undertake a similar operation against Cuba’s Fidel Castro who came to power after disposing the Batista regime, and had since developed close ties with the Soviet Union. The force which constituted mostly of Cuban exiles landed in Southern Cuba on April 17, 1961. However this adventure resulted in failure as the Cubans were successful in repulsing back the attack.
c) Chile and Pinochet (1973)
In September 1973, Chile’s elected President Salvador Allende who had ties with Cuba’s Castro was overthrown by a military junta led by Augusto Pinochet. This coup was facilitated by the CIA.
d) The Contadora Initiative (1981)
This project was launched to counter the Sandinista government of Nicaragua which had an ultra let orientation. The US had two problems with the Sandinistas first, was their relation with

the Soviet Union and Second was their support to Salvadoran revolutionaries . This project continued till the end of the Cold war when the Sandinistas were thrown out of power through elections. What was unique about this project was that Nicaragua was able to drag the US into the ICJ and successfully argued for a hostile judgement in it.
Some of the important direct military interventions were:
a) Invasion of Grenada (1983)
In 1979, a revolution led by Maurice Bishop came to power with Cuban Support. An internal power struggle ensued resulting in the Bishop’s arrest and execution. 10,000 US, Jamaican and Caribbean troops landed on October 24, 1983 during the crisis.
b) Invasion of Panama (1989)
In December 1989, President Bush Sr. ordered a military invasion of Panama to arrest its President Manuel Noriega and overthrow his government who was accused of participating in drug trafficking. The operation led to thousands of civilian causalities.
c) Invasion of Haiti (1994)
In September 1994, Clinton ordered the US military to occupy Haiti and overthrow its Government and the flow of undocumented Haitians were cited as a reason for intervention. Establishing a Constitutional government the US argued would enable it to refuse asylees or refugees from Haiti.
Jorge Dominguez argues that during the Cold war the threat to the US interest in Latin America was mostly ideological than economic and was mostly guided by the ‘Cuban Threat’ after the Revolution of 1959.
3

Post Cold War US-Latin American relations can be explained in terms of ‘tension points’ which may be defined as “alliances forged by the US within elements in weak institutionalized or unstable Latin American countries so as to affect political outcomes favourable to it”. These points have been formed through two processes: 1) firstly, by strengthening the institution of the armed forces of the Latin American countries by providing training, equipping and facilitating financial resources, which would act as a check on policies of democratically elected governments and 2) secondly, by forging alliance within the political elites, either indoctrinated to its ideology or are favourable towards it, and supporting their claims within the political establishment through various covert means. This category also includes the role of epistemic communities within the weak countries who through a) their specialization b) their strong social networks and c) their ability to shape public opinion exerts tremendous influence on political elites in shaping political outcomes. Of the above two the later is specifically created to intervene in democratic set ups as it operates outside of public scrutiny. The combination of both these factors has led to a phenomenon which could be termed as ‘controlled democracies’ with the result that the decision making processes of the Latin American countries serve the interest of the US instead of their domestic electorate to who they are responsible and accountable.

Combined with these factors the US has identified new issue areas such as narco-trade, immigration, environment etc. to intervene in internal affairs of Latin American countries. As Jorge Castaneda argues that the evil (Soviet/Communist) empire to the east has given way to evil (drug producing/ immigration generating) slums of the south. Infact drug enforcement has led to highly intrusive form of cooperation, including US support for counter insurgency operation in Colombia . Peter Andreas points out that the threat from such non-traditional sources are perceived in the US to be so high that allocation made to Federal law enforcement agencies increased manifold during the period 1991-96 for fighting crimes emanating from the south. This he refers to as the rise of the ‘crime fare’ state as opposed to welfare state as allocation for fighting crime took place in a period of austerity when resources meant for other sectors like health, energy, education etc. took a backseat . And after 9/11, war on terror has been added to this swelling list.
4

The US is primarily concerned with ‘the realistic’ notion of solving problems which essentially implies the ‘problem solving approach to IR’. The main problem with this approach is its excessive emphasis on ‘presentism’ which in effect implies that problems are a creation of the present environment and has to be dealt only in the present context. Thus ahistoricity is deeply embedded into this approach. And in the Latin American scenario some of its basic problems are deeply rooted in the historical events of the past. For instance, if immigration is a security problem than what explains the mass migration of people from poor Latin American countries to the US? The problem solving could not provide any effective answer. Out of various causes, one of the plausible answer, if viewed from a historical perspective, is that successive governments in these countries has failed to bring about perceptible socio-economic changes mostly due to factors external to the country leading to formation of ‘an island of plenty in the midst of a sea of poverty’ which is why people migrate to ‘the Island’.
The epistemic communities in poor Latin American countries could be related to the role of intellectuals in Gramsci’s theory of Hegemony where “they perform the function of developing and sustaining the mental images, technologies and organisations which bind together the members of a class and of a historic block into a common identity” (Cox, 1993) leading to formation of institutions and ideologies which gets universalized among all sections of people . The fact that epistemic communities in the Latin American countries exist and have worked in favour of the US can be gauged from the observation made by Dos Santos:
“These countries have designed their development models to work internally and unilaterally opened up their economies to foreign capital, auctioned , privatized and denationalize important wealth source including water and bio-diversity, and increased their functional dependence on the United States” ( Dos Santos,2002) .



Bibliography:

1) Atkins, G Pope (1989), Latin America in the International Political System, Boulder, Sans Francisco & London, Westview Press

2) Dominguez, Jorge I. (1999), US-Latin American Relation during the Cold War and its Aftermath, Working Paper series 99-01, Harvard university

3) Castaneda, Jorge G. (1990), Latin America and the End of Cold War, World Policy Journal

4) Andreas, Peter (1997), “The Rise of the American Crimefare State”, World policy Journal

5) Cox, Robert (1993), Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations, in Stephen Gill (Ed), Gramsci Historical Materialism and International Relations, Toronto, Cambridge University Press

6) Salazar, Luis Suarez and Mariana Ortega Brena (2007), The New Pan – American Order: The Crisis and Reconstitution of the US System of Global Domination, Latin American Perspecteive

Author>: Jamini Buragohain
M.A. Fourth Semester
CPIS
School of International Studies

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