UNDERSTANDING THE DEMOCRATIC AND SECURITY DEFICIT IN CENTRAL ASIA: A SCHEMATIC APPROACH

ABSTRACT: This paper looks at how the five Central Asian states, gaining sudden, unprepared independence in the 1990s due to the Soviet collapse is furthering away from the much anticipated democracy. In the varying literature defining different flavours in ‘Democracies’, I would like to place the Central Asian states in trying to comprehend whether they are really democracies of a different flavor or not democracies at all. In a very schematic explanation, democracy can be best explained as the rule of the majority. In Central Asian states, even the electoral processes are frowned upon in suspicion regarding its authencity. Here, the interplay between democracy and factors like political composition, economic factors and role of religion is looked at. It is then linked to the security concerns in the region form a theoretical discourse, and final conclusive analysis is reached upon how ‘democracy deficit’ leads to ‘security deficit’ in the region.

INTRODUCTION

Central Asia is known as the pivot of Asia. It is completely isolated from the sea and its influence. It consists of the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan, in the Old Turkic language meant ‘land of 40 tribes’, suggesting the importance of sub ethnic clans in these regions. As Dr. Phool Badan’s intensive study has indicated, after the October Revolution, the ‘Russification’ policy was carried forward by the Soviet regime, but it did not tickle down to the grass-root level, as they slipped back to their indigenous cultural fold as soon as Soviet influences decreased. He notes that Gorbachev’s policy reform of Perestroika and Glasnost not only brought changes in their own polity but also in the Central Asian states as ”restructuring” and “openness” encouraged the formation of “informal groups”, and the Central Asian people stated to revive their native culture, most important of it being the “ Islamic revivalism”. The Muslim leaders in Tajikistan were arrested in 1986-87 by the KGB and subsequently tried for raising a call for Jihad against the Soviet Central Asian authority. The same period witnessed the call of slogans like “Kazakhstan is only for the Kazakh”.[1] The point of the matter is, the twin policies of Gorbachev brought greater transparency and demos in the Central Asian societies, and it is these same democratic modules which led to greater authoritarianism, “Managed” and “illiberal democracy” in these states. The openness granted to these societies resulted in the re-emergence of socio-cultural factors which were suppressed due to the communist style ‘Russification’ of the Central Asian states after the October Revolution.

This paper looks at how the five Central Asian states, gaining sudden, unprepared independence in the 1990s due to the Soviet collapse is furthering away from the much anticipated democracy.

POLITY, ECONOMY AND DEMOCRACY

Samuel Huntington, speaking of clash of civilizations and the ‘third wave of democratization’, showed how these third wave democracies are “something other than fully democratic”[2]. Francis Fukuyama, in a controversial essay published in journal ‘The National Interest’, suggested that liberal democracies had triumphed over communist/socialist model while in his ‘ The End of History and the Last Man’, was further convinced that “ history has ended” and through trail and error method, all newly independent states will eventually lead to Democratic Liberal model. In contrast, many have recognized the fact that it may not be as smooth a process after all. Fault lines are noted by theorists as to why liberal democratic model do not find a smooth transition in Post Soviet, Central Asian states.[3] Thomas Carothers suggests that the ‘Central Asian states are a dispiriting collection of politically retrograde entities’. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are to him under absolutist rule, and Aksar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan has eventually showed authoritarian tendencies after the 1995 elections. The rationale they use is of being benevolent dictators and of “soft authoritarianism” for the benefit of the people and stabilizing the economy.[4] Bunce has interesting arguments in this regard showing that the process of ‘Democratization and Economic Reform’ having both a negative and a positive effect, depending on regional equations.[5] Bunce believes that ‘transitions to democracy seem to vary considerably with respect to uncertainty surrounding the processes’ even when there is certainty of procedure (electoral processes, held at regular intervals). This theory can effectively explain the differences between Western and Central Asian states. The latter’s democracy was sudden with no ground for preparation, resulting in a weak democratization process. [6] Fareed Zakaria has spoken of ‘illiberal democracies’, where the democratically elected regimes, once in power, often ignore constitutional limits on their power and undermine democracy[7]. Statistics show high percentage of literacy rate and equally attractive figures in democracy indicators, but the ground reality often belies the factual element as noted by scholars, in the case of Central Asian states. O’Donnell, in his explanation of ‘Delegative Democracy’, speaks of this basic premise where the President remains ‘the embodiment of the Nation and the main custodian of national interest’. He believes that such democracies are ‘not alien’ to the democratic tradition. It’s rather of a Hobbesian variety. [8] Central Asian states are closer to this ‘Delegative’ model than the ‘Consensual’ model of Lijphart.

TABLE 1

LITERACY RATES IN CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

COUNTRY	KAZAKHSTAN	KRYGYZSTAN	TAJIKISTAN	TURKMENISTAN	UZBEKISTAN
LITERACY (%) (2005)	98.4	97	99.4	98	99.3

SOURCE: CIA World Fact Book updated April 2005.

TABLE 2

FREEDOM HOUSE DEMOCRACY INDICATORS

(2004)	KAZAKHISTAN	KYRGYZSTAN	TAJIKISTAN	TURKMENISTAN	UZBEKISTAN
Electoral Process	6.50	6.00	5.75	7.00	6.75
Civil Society	5.50	4.50	5.00	7.00	6.50
Independent Media	6.50	6.00	5.75	7.00	6.75
Governance	6.25	6.00	5.75	7.00	6.25
Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework	6.25	5.50	5.75	7.00	6.50
Corruption	6.50	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.00

SOURCE: Alexander Motyl and Amanda Schetzer, Nations in Transit, 2004: Democratization in East Europe and Eurasia (New York: Freedom House, 2004) the scale is from 1 to 7, [7 being the highest.]

Technically, these figures create a mirage of well functioning democracy in these states. However Paul Kubicek throws light on how far this mirage meets reality. His study presents to us a rather different picture of a ‘’benign forms of authoritarianism’, as he found a global survey of local official reveal ‘undemocratic attitudes’ among these states. Power is personalized, based on tribal or clan connections. Kubicek shows that in Uzbekistan, the new constitution gives the Oliy Majlis (Parliament) the ultimate authority but in reality, the president has the power of issuing presidential decree on any sphere. Opposition parties exist only to create a veneer of democracy. This is explained in terms to providing a ‘cult of stability’ to Vatan (Nation), unlike the civil war infested neighbourhood like in Tajikistan. Kubicek ponders whether such strong Patrimonial dictatorship is wholly undesirable in Central Asia as ‘the introduction of democratic government would cause two serious dilemmas: the rise of nationalist groups and political gridlock’ due to its sub-ethnic, clan based social composition.[9]

RENTAL ECONOMY: A TIMED SUCCESS

The questions that then arise is that why are these regions pseudo-democratic? A simple explanation to religion leaves many things unnoticed. An explanation to this can be grasped from the concept of ‘Rental Economy’. These economies, depending solely on natural resources like oil and gas, fall into these concepts. A resource rich transition economy faces hurdles when it comes to non-oil traded goods sectors. Data shows how Central Asian states are profiting in Oil exports, but regional disparity remains as such wealth is concentrated only among the elites. Even in the long run, this factual economic affluence would not remain, as these resources being non- renewable, extensive dependence while ignoring other Industrial sector development would be detrimental in the long run. Kazakhstan possesses enormous fossil fuel reserves and plentiful supplies of other minerals and metals. It also has a large agricultural sector featuring livestock and grain. Kazakhstan's industrial sector rests on the extraction and processing of these natural resources. Kazakhstan enjoyed double-digit growth in 2000-01 and 8% or more per year in 2002-07 - thanks largely to its booming energy sector, but also to economic reform, good harvests, and increased foreign investment; growth slowed to 2.4% in 2008, however, as a result of declining oil prices and a softening world economy. Inflation reached 10% in 2007 and 17% in 2008. The country has embarked upon an industrial policy designed to diversify the economy away from overdependence on the oil sector by developing its manufacturing potential. Tajikistan, on the other hand, has one of the lowest per capita GDPs among the 15 former Soviet republics. Because of alack of employment opportunities in Tajikistan, nearly half of the labor forces work abroad, primarily in Russia, supporting families in Tajikistan through remittances. Less than 7% of the land area is arable. Cotton is the most important crop, but this sector is burdened with debt and obsolete infrastructure. Mineral resources include silver, gold, uranium, and tungsten, which remain largely untapped due to infrastructural deficiencies. Industry consists only of a large aluminum plant, hydropower facilities, and small obsolete factories mostly in light industry and food processing. The civil war (1992-97) severely damaged the already weak economic infrastructure and caused a sharp decline in industrial and agricultural production. Tajikistan's economic situation remains fragile due to uneven implementation of structural reforms, corruption, weak governance, widespread unemployment, seasonal power shortages, and the external debt burden. This further shows the inter-regional economic disparity.[10] The sole dependence on natural resources as a means of income would have severe repercussions in the future, as they are largely non-renewable. Perhaps this has lead to Kazakhstan’s need for diversification in its economic- industrial sector.

ROLE OF ISLAM, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS TOWARDS THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Prior to Russian conquest, the cultural and political life of Central Asian people (both nomadic and sedentary population) had a predominant influence of Islam since its introduction during the 8^th century, which was the main source of legitimization. The Islamic religion was dominant in the 19^th century among Khanates of the region. Bukhara was regarded as ‘the true support of Islam”. The people observed the Islamic practices in accordance with Koranic precepts. Even though after the October Revolution the Adat and Shariat were replaced throughout Central Asia by 1927 with a Uniform Soviet Law, their independence saw the re assertion of Sufism and Islam as a binding factor among the states. The revival of Islamic customs and traditions has been greatly influenced by the Afghan Jihad and the religious broadcast from Iran, helping in assertion their separate identity from Slavic states. The Islamic countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Afghanistan and to some extent Pakistan is also known to have contributed to revivalism of Islam in these states. However, Abeed Khalil believes Soviet influence has a strong impact on these societies that must not be ignored. He holds that ‘ Islam has not one, not two, but many faces in Central Asia and the world at large…In Central Asia, we can be sure that Muslims will invoke Islam in their struggles over the destinies of their societies. What the will mean by Islam, however, will depend on the historical and political conditions in which Central Asians find themselves rather than on the desire to imitate other Muslim societies or to follow the injunctions of the great Islamic Books.’[11]

Robin Wright is of the opinion that since the dismemberment of Soviet Union in 1991,

‘Islamist in the former Central Asian Republics have petition for legal recognition’. The Central Asian states have been never exposed to democracy, and the political vacuum sought to be filled by Islamic Shariat rule. But its close relation and recognition of Israel proves that they are not interested in staunch or radical Islam. Religion for the leaders is a quick fix binding factor. The Central Asian Islamists, unlike Western fears, are not keen in imitating Iran. Wright notes that the suspicion and animosity with which the west views Central Asia or Islam has no such credibility in this particular case, marking a clear distinction between ‘Political’ and ‘Radical’ Islam.[12] Frédéric Volpi has argued that some countries may be experiencing genuine transitions from authoritarianism to Liberal Democracy (e.g. Indonesia) while others (e.g. Saudi Arabia) may remain the same. Pseudo-democratic systems, however, are a common occurrence throughout the Muslim world. He agrees with Diamond that most of these hybrid regimes are deliberately pseudo-democratic; From this perspective 'pseudo-democracy' is a political order that tries to look like a liberal democracy without trying to become one. Scholars like Augustus Norton or Massoud Kamali argue that a 'civil society' is slowly being created and that a democratic ethos is consolidating in the Muslim world. At the same time political analysts like Mark Tessler or Richard Rose propose that the religious beliefs held by the citizenry in various parts of the Muslim world do not in themselves seem to preclude people from taking an interest in ‘democracy’. To him, viewing democratization in the Muslim world solely or primarily from this perspective can quickly become counterproductive. From a survey of Central Asian countries with substantial Russian minorities he finds no significant differences between these non-Muslim minorities and the rest of the Muslim population when it comes to judging the relative costs and benefits of democracy and of (Soviet-style) authoritarianism.

THE GREAT GAME: SECURITY PARADIME

The breakup of Soviet Union and the creation of five Central Asian Republics have complicated the security relations of the Asian states. Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia and China each seek to promote stability in Central Asia. The ongoing civil war and corrupt electoral process in Afghanistan remains the most immediate extra regional threat to security. The current growth of Islam is both a cause and a result of mistrust by Central Asian secular leaders, who see it as a new "threat" to justify their suppression of internal dissent. Martha Brill Olcott argues that secular leaders themselves are responsible for Islam's growth: “Islam to her is not the cause of instability but its spread is instead a response to their own inability to control their economies, societies and their states.” Pakistani policymakers initially envisioned a Muslim security belt stretching from Turkey to Pakistan, with Central Asia as the "buckle" to provide "strategic depth." as needed allies in Pakistan's policy struggles over Afghanistan and Kashmir. Indian economic programs focused on the two regional linchpins: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Russian security policy exploits the fate of the eight to ten million ethnic Russians who still live in Central Asia.[13] So, every state in the periphery, from Russia to India has a regional stake in Central Asia.

Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt, looking through neo-realist aspects and its limitations in the region, draw the conclusion that ‘Tajikistan has seen more conflict than the other Central Asian states and Russian military involvement. Domestic upheaval in that country resulted when ruling political elites faced opponents using alternatives modes of social mobilization such as clans, regionalism, ethnic nationalism, and Islam. Already Central Asia's poorest country, Tajikistan also faced a severe economic crisis that aggravated political instability. The domestic conflict ultimately drew in Russia.’ This clearly portrays how economic and political instability in these regions call for interventions from Russia and US… which furthers the security deficit as a direct resultant of the democracy deficit the region faces. In their words, ‘Late state formation and the lack of experience with democratic government predispose the Central Asian states to authoritarianism.’[14]

CONCLUSION

McFaul contends that ‘the transition from communism in Europe and the former Soviet Union has only sometimes led to democracy…The remaining majority of new post communist states are various shades of dictatorships or unconsolidated transitional regimes’. This explains the type of democracies that also exist in Central Asia. McFaul disagrees with the application of the third-wave hypotheses, which to him distort rather than illuminate this fourth wave of regime change. To him, ‘the preponderance of non democracies raises real questions about why postcommunist transitions should be subsumed under the third wave of democratization at all.’ Imposed transitions from above in the former communist world produced not partial democracy but dictatorship. It is instead revolutionary transitions, the mode of transition thought to be least likely to facilitate democratic outcomes by third-wave theorists that have actually produced the most stable and consolidated democracies in the postcommunist world, as the case in Central Asia. Unlike Huntington, who believed that "negotiation and compromise among political elites were at the heart of the democratization processes," McFaul notes in a zero-sum understanding that the onus in these states depend on their leader’s choice. ‘If the powerful believed in democratic principles, then they imposed democratic institutions. But if they believed in autocratic principles, then they imposed autocratic institutions’. This ‘actor centric’ theory of transition can better explain the political process in Central Asia and the Post Communist states at large.[15]

On the question of ‘Security Deficit’, it can be linked to the deficit in the arena of democracy in Central Asia as authoritarian or partial democratic states require a strong force to maintain internal balance while its non democratic nature might instigate non democratic violent elements impacting on the system both from internally as well as externally. As Olcott, in her book, showed, post 9/11… and specifically the close borders to Afghanistan and Pakistan, have implications of the ‘security’ question in the domestics of Central Asia. Larger role of US in alliance with Kazakhstan for example, can instigate Uzbekistan’s terrorist elements to be more active and in sync with the Taliban and the Al Qaeda, a point duly noted in Rohan Gunaratna’s understanding. He feels that Al Qaeda uses ideological penetration in Muslim Central Asia, ‘and pockets of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will likely see it emerge as a base for a new wave for Post Taliban Islamism’[16].

REFERENCES

TEXT BOOKS

1. Phool Badan, ‘Dynamics of Political Development in Central Asia’, Lancers’ Books, 2001

2. Abeed Khalil, ‘Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia’, University of California Press, 2007,

3. Martha B. Olcott, ‘Central Asia’s Second Chance’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2005

4. Richard Sakwa, ‘Post-Communism’, Viva Books, New Delhi, 2005 (reprint)

5. Rohan Gunaratna, ‘ Inside Al Qaeda: A global network of Terror’, Lotus-Roli Books Pvt. Ltd, Fourth Impression 2009, p.p. 168-172

ARTICLES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Democracy For The Long Haul’, Journal of Democracy, Vol 7 , No. 2, p.p 2-1

2. Louise Forsyth, David Gould, David Lawrence, ‘History Didactics in the Post Cold War World: Central Asia Middle East and China, The History Teacher, Vol 33,no.4, (Aug 2000) p.p 425-451

3. Michael McFaul, ‘The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World’, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Jan., 2002), pp. 212-244.

4. Thomas Carothers, ‘Democracy without Illusions’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, ( Jan-Feb., 1997) p.p. 85-99

5. Valerie Bunce, ‘Democratization and Economic Reform’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 4, 2001, p.p 43-65

6. V. Bunce, ‘Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcomunist Experience, World Politics, Vol 55, 2003, p.p 167-192

7. Fareed Zakaria, ‘The rise of Illiberal Democracies’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, ( Nov- Dec 1997), p.p. 22-43

8. Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy?’ Kellogg Institute Working Paper # 192 (April 1993)

9. Paul Kubicek, ‘Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or Cure?’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.1,(Mar 1998) p.p. 29-43

10. Robin Wright, ‘Islam, Democracy and the West’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3, (Summer 1992) p.p 131-145

11. Dianne L. Smith, ‘Central Asia: A new great game?’, Asian Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall, 1996), pp. 147-175

12. Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt, ‘The Limits of Neorealist: Understanding Security in Central Asia’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 87-105

13. Stuart Hoffman, ‘Themes in official discourses on Terrorism in Central Asia’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1

14. Said Yakhyoev, ‘Conflict Transformation and Strategic Peacebuilding in Central Asia, www.beyondintractability.org, July 2006.

15. Shahram Akbarzadeh, ‘Keeping Central Asia Stable’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2004), pp. 689-705

16. Abraham Diskin, Hanna Diskin, Reuven Y. Hazan, ‘Why Democracies Collapse: The Reasons for Democratic Failure and Success’, International Political Science Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 291-309

INTERNET MATERIALS

1. Central Intelligence Agency, The world Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/index.html

2. BBC News, ,Guide to Central Asia, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/456900/456938/html/nn1page1.stm

---

[1] Phool Badan, ‘Dynamics of Political Development in Central Asia’, Lancers’ Books, 2001

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Democracy For The Long Haul’, Journal of Democracy, Vol 7 , No. 2, p.p 2-13

[3] Louise Forsyth, David Gould, David Lawrence, ‘History Didactics in the Post Cold War World: Central Asia Middle East and China, The History Teacher, Vol 33,no.4, (Aug 2000) p.p 425-451

[4] Thomas Carothers, ‘Democracy without Illusions’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1, ( Jan-Feb., 1997) p.p. 85-99

[5] V. Bunce, ‘Democratization and Economic Reform’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 4, 2001, p.p 43-65

[6] V. Bunce, ‘Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcomunist Experience, World Politics, Vol 55, 2003, p.p 167-192

[7] Fareed Zakaria, ‘The rise of Illiberal Democracies’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, ( Nov- Dec 1997), p.p. 22-43

[8] Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy?’ Kellogg Institute Working Paper # 192 (April 1993)

[9] Paul Kubicek, ‘Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or Cure?’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.1,(Mar 1998) p.p. 29-43

[10] Central Intelligence Agency, The world Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/index.html

[11] Abeed Khalil, ‘Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia’, University of California Press, 2007, p.p 200-201

[12] Robin Wright, ‘Islam, Democracy and the West’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3, (Summer 1992) p.p 131-145

[13] Dianne L. Smith, ‘Central Asia: A new great game?’, Asian Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall, 1996), pp. 147-175

[14] Rajan Menon and Hendrik Spruyt, ‘The Limits of Neorealist: Understanding Security in Central Asia’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 87-105

[15] Michael McFaul, ‘The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World’, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Jan., 2002), pp. 212-244.

[16] Rohan Gunaratna, ‘ Inside Al Qaeda: A global network of Terror’, Lotus-Roli Books Pvt. Ltd, Fourth Impression 2009, p.p. 168-172