THE KURDISH ISSUE : THE IMPACT ON THE POLITICS OF IRAQ AND TURKEY AND THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS REGARDING KURDS POST SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME.

THIS ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED IN THE "FOREIGN POLICY JOURNAL".

The Link: www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/22/the-kurdish-issue/


Introduction

Kurds are the largest stateless minority in the world, with an estimated 30 million Kurds in a geographic area encompassing territories in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Armenia. They comprise 18% of the population in Turkey and 15-20% in Iraq, and are the third largest ethnic group in the region after the Arabs and Persians. A largely Sunni Muslim people with their own language and culture, most Kurds live in the generally contiguous areas of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Armenia and Syria—a mountainous region of southwest Asia generally known as Kurdistan (Land of the Kurds). Non-Arab minority populations, Kurds are also an Linguistic minority, speakers of Kurdish, a subdivision of the Iranic branch of the Indo-European family of languages, which is akin to Persian. Modern Kurdish divides into two major groups: 1) the Kurmanji group and, 2) the Gurani group. These are supplemented by many sub-dialects. The most popular vernacular is that of Kurmanji (or Kirmancha), spoken by about three-quarters of the Kurds today. Kurmanji divided into North Kurmanji (also called Bahdinani, with around 15 million speakers, primarily in Turkey, Syria, and the former Soviet Union) and South Kurmanji (also called Sorani, with about 6 million speakers, primarily in Iraq and Iran).[1]

The 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which created the modern states of Iraq, Syria, and Kuwait, was to have included the possibility of a Kurdish state in the region. However, it was never implemented.[2] After the overthrow of the Turkish monarchy by Kemal Ataturk, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq each agreed not to recognize an independent Kurdish state. The Kurds received especially harsh treatment at the hands of the Turkish government, which tried to deprive them of Kurdish identity by designating them “Mountain Turks,” outlawing their language and forbidding them to wear traditional Kurdish costumes in the cities, a direct attack on their culture. The government also encouraged the migration of Kurds to the cities to dilute the population in the uplands. Turkey continues its policy of not recognizing the Kurds as a minority group. In Iraq, Kurds have faced similar repression. After the Kurds supported Iran in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein retaliated, razing villages and attacking peasants with chemical weapons. The Kurds rebelled again after the Persian Gulf War only to be crushed again by Iraqi troops. About 2 million fled to Iran; 5 million currently live in Iraq. The United States has tried to create a safe haven for the Kurds within Iraq by imposing a “no-fly” zone north of the 36th parallel.

Despite a common goal of independent statehood, the 20 million or so Kurds in the various countries are hardly unified.

The paper tries to look the Kurdish Issue through the three lenses:
1. The issue of Kurdistan
2. The intra state relations between the Kurds and the government in Iraq and Turkey
3. And since these two West Asian states share borders, the impact on their respective bilateral relations with each other under this framework.


The Issue of Kurdistan

The main hindrance to the formation of ‘Kurdistan’, literally meaning Land of the Kurds, lies in the fact that the Kurds have internal divisions which often come in way to unify them. They lack any single unified language (spoken or written). Even on the grounds of religion, they do not comprise of a homogeneous category. The majority of the Kurds are Sunni however; one can also find Kurds who are Alevis, Shi’a or Christians. The Kurdish ‘nation’ also would include smaller sects such as the Yazidis, as well as Christian minorities like the Assyrian and the Syrian Orthodox.

The area comprising Kurdistan includes approximately parts of eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, north-western Iran and northern Syria inhabited mainly by Kurds. The permanent Iraqi constitution in Article 113 states, ‘This Constitution shall approbate the region of Kurdistan and its existing regional and federal authorities, at the time this constitution comes into force. This Constitution shall approbate the region of Kurdistan and its existing regional and federal authorities, at the time this constitution comes into force.’[3], hence making it an official-political statement in recognizing the autonomous federal entity of the Kurds and granting it an official recognition internationally.

Kurds in Iran are also officially recognized as a minority, and there is a province by the name of ‘Kurdistan’ in Iran. The problem surfaces with the way the Kurds are looked upon in Turkey. The Kurds were historically concentrated in eleven provinces of the southeast. There are also isolated Kurdish villages in other parts of Turkey. Kurds migrated to Istanbul for centuries, and since 1960 they had migrated to almost all other urban centres as well. Turkey’s censuses do not list Kurds as a separate ethnic group. Consequently, there has been no reliable data on their total numbers. Unlike the Sunni Turks, who follow the Hanafi School of Islamic law, the Sunni Kurds follow the Shafii School. However, the Kurds are divided between several states making them a minority in each.

Kurish Demand and the Government Reaction

The Kurds have often demanded their own independence with varying degree of reciprocity as well as animosity. The focus here would be on how the Issue of Kurdistan has been entertained and dealt with by the two neighbouring states of West Asia—Iraq and Turkey. A short historical schema is shown to understand the situation of Kurds today in these regions on general terms.
Iraq.

During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi government implemented anti-Kurdish policies which was widely condemned by the international community, but was never seriously punished for oppressive measures, including the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, which resulted in thousands of deaths. The ‘Al-Anfal Campaign’[4] constituted a systematic genocide of the Kurdish people in Iraq. Large Kurdish town of Qala Dizeh was completely destroyed by the Iraqi army. The campaign also included Arabization of Kirkuk, a program to drive Kurds out of the oil-rich city and replace them with Arab settlers from central and southern Iraq. Needless to say, there were blatant violations of Human Rights along with life itself.

Saddam Hussein’s regime proved even more disastrous for the Kurds in Iraq. After the Gulf crisis, U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 gave birth to a safe haven following international concern for the safety of Kurdish refugees. The U.S. and British government established a No Fly Zone over a chunk of northern Iraq; however, it left some of the Kurdish populated areas unprotected.. Bloody clashes between Iraqi forces and Kurdish troops continued but then finally the Iraqi government fully withdrew 1991, allowing Iraqi Kurdistan to function de facto independently. The region was to be ruled by the two principal Kurdish parties—the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Then again, tensions between the two principle Kurdish Parties led to intra-Kurdish conflict and warfare.

Prior to the U.S.-led invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in March 2003, Turkey denied the U.S. the bases in Turkey to launch a northern front into Iraq. This Turkish decision unintentionally made the Iraqi Kurds a powerful ally for the U.S. Aided by the Kurds, U.S. Forces were able to open a northern front in Iraq and secure the oil fields in and around Kirkuk. This ensured the Kurds a prominent role in the future of Iraq. The new government for Iraq post-Saddam Hussein proved very comforting for the Kurds. The Iraq Governing Council (IGC) that was appointed in July 2003 had Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, along with three independent Kurdish leaders. The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for The Transitional Period (TAL),[5] signed March 8, 2004, laid out a political transition process, as well as citizens’ rights, and much of the debate over the TAL concerned the rights and privileges of the Kurds. Further, both the Arabic and Kurdish languages were deemed “the two official languages of Iraq”—an unprecedented gain for the Kurds historically. Further, the constitution also reflected on this change where Islamic principles are to be considered “a source,” but not the only or the primary source, of law. Thus, the assumption based on the recent positive changes showed a gradual improvement in the life of the Kurds in Iraq.


Turkey

The Kurds live across all of Turkey but the majority live to the east and southeast of the country. The republic of Turkey’s treatment of its citizens of Kurdish ethnicity has been a frequent subject of international criticism. It is generally believed that Kemal Attatuk was the main discriminator of these Kurds, known as ‘Mountain Turks’ here (a deprivation of their religious, ethinic, notional as well as their linguistic identities). The Sevres Treaty of 1920 partitioned Turkey, reducing it to one-third of the Empire’s size, and promised the Kurds a country of their own. Ataturk rejected Sevres and rallied Turks in a “war of liberation.” Victorious, he succeeded in scuttling Sevres and replacing it with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. In 1925, Kurds launched an insurgency to restore the autonomy that existed under Ottoman rule, but the rebellion was brutally put down and its ringleaders hanged in the central square of Diyarbakir. In the 1930s, Turkish government policy has aimed at forcible dissimilation and Turkification policies of the local Kurds. Following the 1937 Tunceli uprising, Turkey adopted draconian measures denying the very existence of Kurds in Turkey and referring to them as “Mountain Turks.” Kurdish language, culture, and geographical place names were banned. Simmering tensions continued until Turkey’s military coup on September 12, 1980.

However, the sudden success the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan , or PKK) had in mobilizing large number of Kurds during 1980s and 1990s in its struggle against the Turkish state showed that years of Turkish Republican rule that institutionalized and sedimented Turkey’s policy of denial of Kurdish identity, language and culture remained futile. Furthermore, the establishment of the Turkish Workers Party (TIP) in 1961 and its broad agenda offered an election platform where Kurdish demands and national rights could be discussed. The ‘sociopolitical pluralism’ that Turkey experienced during the 1960s weakened the state’s ability to hegemonize the social identity of its citizens resulting in the emergence of a number of alternative discourses challenging the dominant Kemalist identity, the Kurdish nationalist movement among them.

In the present context, Turkey’s chances of entering the EU will significantly increase if it can achieve a long-term resolution of its Kurdish issue by continuing and implementing its legal-political reforms in order to tackle its ethnic plurality via liberal democracy and economic development. It would also significantly increase the EU’s credibility and political-economic weight as a global actor and as a social-political project, in the developing world in general and the Muslim world in particular. The more Turkey can secure its relations with its citizens of Kurdish origin through democratic and developmental means, the less it would be threatened by Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and elsewhere. With local elections looming, the AKP initiated full-time Kurdish language broadcasts on Turkish Radio and Television in 2009. Recent positive changes are gradually being witnessed like allowing Kurdish names to the children, etc., which were previously outlawed by the government authority.

Turkey and the European Union

Turkey is a state that borders Europe and Asia. It is a democratic, secular, unitaty, constitutional republic, with an ancient and historical cultural heritage. Its constitution reasserts the principle of being a secular state, making the Tukish National the supreme identity in its soil. However, Turkish as the official language and the complete disregard for the fact that Kurds have a separate identity on any terms have brought into question its secular, democratic nature. Turkey and the EU relations have evolved with lots of difficulties since Turkey’s application date for full membership on September 12, 1987. Historically, Turkey is a strategically important country for the EU. Still there are certain barriers. The minority treatment issue is one of those barriers. In fact, “respect for and protection of minorities” is one of the principles accepted in the Copenhagen Criteria which defines whether a country is eligible to join the European Union.

Turkey’s Kurdish issue, in this sense, is one of the stumbling blocks of Turkey on the road to EU accession. On October 3, 2005, when the European Union formally initiated accession negotiations with Turkey, more attention than ever was focused on the Kurdish problem of Turkey. Until recently, Turkey was even denying having a Kurdish problem to begin with, and speaking Kurdish was a crime according to the law. Therefore, it was sensation when Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan admitted that there is a Kurdish problem. Until then, this problem was “pronounced” as “southeastern problem” or “southeastern issue”.

Bilateral Relations Between Iraq and Turkey: The Kurd Factor

Turkey and Saddam’s regime enjoyed good trade and political relations until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Economic sanctions imposed on Iraq had an obvious detrimental impact on the economic relations between the two states. Hot air was blown between the two when Turkey allowed NATO aircraft to use its territory to impose the no-fly zone over the north of the country. However, the relations between these two states have entered a new phase since the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US forces. Since then, the Iraqi governing authority has coordinated with Turkey over issues like border control and trade. Turkey today is one of the important gateways to Iraqi oil. However, Turkey is vehemently against Iraq’s granting of autonomy to the Kurds in the northern Iraqi provinces, as this could lead to demands of a similar nature back home, an issue the Turkish authorities have not yet come to terms with.

Iraqi Kurds, threatened with a military incursion by Turkey, find themselves in a pivotal—and ironic—position as Ankara and Washington searched for ways to end attacks by Turkish Kurdish militants holed up in semi-autonomous northern Iraq. Turkey wanted a diplomatic solution to a crisis which has seen scores of Turkish troops killed in cross-border raids by PKK forces. Ankara did not recognize the KRG and refused to meet with its representatives in any official capacity. That reflects Ankara’s fear that any international respect shown to the autonomous Iraqi Kurdish region would only embolden Turkey’s own Kurdish minority to seek similar home-rule status. As Ankara and Washington look for solutions from the Iraqi Kurdish leaders—who are among the strongest supporters of the United States in Iraq—those same leaders see the crisis as presenting them with some valuable bargaining power. One of the main arenas of concern among the recent (post Saddam) bilateral relations between the two bordering state of Iraq and Turkey is definetely the Kurds. Turkey has an abiding fear that if Kirkuk joins the KRG, it will provide the groundwork for an economically viable independent Kurdish state inspiring Turkish Kurds to seek greater autonomy. If Turkey cracked down on the rights of Kurds in Turkey or launched a major military action, either to prevent a referendum on Kirkuk’s status or to attack the PKK, Turkey’s European Union (EU) antagonists could use it as a pretext for impeding Ankara’s candidacy. Its a double jeopardy. Turkey needs a stable and strong Iraq to contain Iran. With powerful Iraqi Shi’a groups acting in ways that advance Tehran’s interests, Iraqi Kurdistan—stable, democratic, and pro-western—could become an essential buffer to sectarian violence emanating from an increasingly chaotic, politically polarized, and religiously radicalized Iraq. But at the same time, the fear remains for Turkey that autonomous Kurdistan could quite obviously entail Turkey’s own domestic Kurds to rise against the Turkish state.

Turkey initially joined the US-led campaign against Iraq under intense US pressure. Perhaps the rationale Turkey adopted was that if it couldn’t supercede the US decision to invade Iraq, at least it would have some impact on post war reconstruction if it remained a US ally. The newly elected government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) gave in to US pressure after a lengthy period of indecision, diplomatic efforts to persuade the Iraqi and US governments to seek a peaceful solution, consultations with the president and the military, and intense negotiations with the US government. However, on 1 March 2003, the Parliament declined the government’s motion to authorize the deployment This was a major blow to US-Turkish relations; Turkey had been a major and consistent strategic partner for the USA, which in turn had supported Turkey in such an important area as the EU membership demands, for one. Turkey had its fear that the PKK, which fought a separatist war against Turkey between 1984 and 1999, would find a safe haven in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.

The second possible consequence was Iraqi-Kurdish statehood or autonomy. The PKK had proved to be a major threat to Turkish state security. Armed clashes with it, which were believed to have cost more than 30,000 lives, mostly ended when the movement’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured with US assistance in Kenya and jailed for life in 1999. However, the PKK remained active politically and militarily in Turkey, Iraq, and other countries, including parts of Western Europe.

A substantial portion of Turkish military and political leaders long suspected the USA—and Israel—of sympathizing with Iraqi-Kurdish statehood, which would reignite Kurdish secessionism within Turkey, to its own detriment. In October 2003, the parliament authorized the deployment of Turkish troops to join the coalition forces in Iraq, in accordance with US demands. However, this prospect met with vocal Iraqi opposition, especially from Iraqi Kurds. They feared that Turkey would use its military presence against Kurdish statehood—a well justified fear at that time. Accordingly, Turkey’s primary interests lie in, first, Iraq’s economic and political stability; second, the emergence of a democratic regime in Iraq; and, third, the pursuit of friendly and cooperative relations with Turkey by the new Iraqi administration in general—and by Iraqi Kurds in particular. In fact, this outcomehould probably be the overriding strategic objective for Turkey, as well as or the USA, the EU, and Iraqi Kurds.

Recently, Iraq has just about entered a semblance of political stability, or at least International Legitimacy, due to the 2005 and 2010 elections. Kurds are definetely in a better position both in terms of gaining autonomy as well as having a part in government. The need of the day obviously requires a changing attitude towards Kurds, not just from the domestic constituency in Iraq, but also from the Turkish perspective. This can be seen as on April 9, 2010, the President of Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, Massoud Barzani, received an official diplomatic visit by the new Turkish consul, Aydin Selcen, who had arrived to take up office in Erbil. Most high-level Iraqi Kurdish officials will readily admit that the key to their future lies in maintaining positive relations with Turkey and also with Iran, which already has a consulate in Erbil. As such,wdisputes and disappointments of the past are being put aside. The establishment of official Turkish diplomatic representation underscores the headway that has been made in transcending these political tensions and building upon the commercial ties that have developed in recent years. Also, The rail link that runs between Iraq and Turkey via Mosul was re-opened in February 2010 after a seven-year closure following the US-led invasion, reinforcing trade links between Turkey and the south of Iraq. Therefore, post-Saddam Hussein, change is definetely in the air for the bilateral relations between both the states of Iraq and Turkey, especially concerning the Kurdish Issue. As Iraq is still in its post-transtitional phase, the future of the Kurdish issue between these two neighbouring states remain quiet uncertain.

Conclusion

Like the Berber community, a nomadic tribe, the Kurds do not have a common, unifying language or religious similarities which could bind them together. In the concluding analysis, therefore, it can be surmised that the Kurdish issue today does have a growing significant impact on the bilateral relations between Turkey and Iraq (the focus of this paper), along with Iran and Syria. The Kurds have finally seen new inspiration after the Iraq case in asserting themselves up front and not hiding behind the traditional fear of state repression. What’s more significant is the eventual Turkish Kurd demand for recognition and the state’s acceptance of the existence of a population called the Kurds in Turkey, which was previously ignored as ‘mountain Turks’ or simply seen as a border ‘Southeast’ problem. The Kurds acheiving great political heights in Iraq significantly improves their morale, and they have already been accredited with autonomy and other political benefits.
The United States has a pivotal role to play in this scenario. However, ultimate responsibility rests with political leaders representing the interests of Turks and Iraqis, including Iraqi Kurds. The “Atlantic Council of the United States and its Program on Transatlantic Relations” director David L. Phillips is of the opinion that “it will be to the advantage of all parties to develop a ‘track two’ dialogue to prepare public opinion for rapprochement and create a critical mass of integrated activities based on a shared vision for the future”. The impetus must come from Turks and Iraqi Kurds themselves. “Civil society activities complement, but cannot replace, official negotiations. An Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbors will have positive reverberations beyond Iraq’s borders. Just as crisis is contagious, progress can affect events across the Middle East and South Asia. Effective power-sharing between Iraqis will demonstrate an alternative to violence for achieving political goals. Regional cooperation between Iraqi Kurds and Turks will affrm the benefts of cooperation over confrontation. Turkey’s continued democratization and development will beneft all Turks, including the Kurds of Turkey, while demonstrating the benefts of secular democracy to the Arab and Muslim world.”

Notes
[1] The US Country Studies Reports speak in elaboration of the various sub dialects spoken by these Kurds
[2] This Treaty of Sevres spoke of an Kurdish State, but this never materialised as the Kurds with their diversity could not establish a united front, whereas during this time frame, state borders were being drawn as permanent structures of mordern states in the Arab world. The missed opporturnity still works as a detriment to the formation of Kurdistan with borders as emphasised by the 1920 Treaty. Even though today we find the autonomous region in Iraq, the creation of Kurdistan, across the borders of several sovereign States, inspite of the geographic continuity of Kurds, seem bleak.
[3] The permanent Constitution is that of the 2005 Constitution, the first Permanent Constituion as well as Government Iraq has ever had.
[4] According to Human Rights Watch, during the Anfal campaign, the Iraqi government massacred 50,000 to 100,000 non-combatant civilians including women and children, destroyed about 4,000 villages (out of 4,655) in Iraqi Kurdistan. Between April 1987 and August 1988, 250 towns and villages were exposed to chemical weapons and destroyed 1,754 schools, 270 hospitals, 2,450 mosques, 27 churches and wiped out around 90% of Kurdish villages in targeted areas.
[5] The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for The Transitional Period (TAL), Iraq’s interim constitution.

Bibliography

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‘Iraq and Kurdish Autonomy’, MERIP Reports, No. 27 (Apr., 1974), pp. 26-27+30 Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project
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Liora Lukitz, ‘Iraq: The search for National Identity’, Frank Cass, London, 1995
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IDSA: ASK AN EXPERT Akash asked: Why the revolution in Middle East is called as Jasmine Revolution? What is its impact on India?

Sonia Roy replies: The association of Jasmine with the Tunisian Revolution, is media-termed, and a debated concept in Tunisia. One explanation is that Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the second president who had came to in 1987, preferred the term ‘Jasmine Revolution’ to describe his bloodless coup. This revolution ended with him fleeing the country in January 2011. Another explanation is that is it named after Tunisia’s national flower, the Jasmine. The overthrow of President Ben Ali was described within the Tunisian tradition of naming regime change after plants. And a third explanation is that the street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi, who lit himself up and started a chain reaction of political riots in Tunisia, sold incense (jasmine).

Strategically speaking, India has by and large remained unaffected by the whole situation in the Middle East. It has adopted the usual ‘wait and watch’ attitude, and continuing relations with these states. India has been careful in its diplomacy in not trying to ‘promote democracy’ but at the same time supporting the aspirations of the people.

There is a large Indian expatriate community in West Asia, especially in the Persian Gulf region and is estimated at 5to 5.5 million. Their safety and well-being are vital for India. In the economic arena, Indian industries have suffered from the general unrest in the region and there are indications of slump in economic activities. The spiralling oil prices and fears over supply disruptions are intrinsically linked to the political stability of the West Asian region.

Sonia Roy is pursuing research at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Email: soniaroy03@gmail.com


idsa.in/askanexpert/JasmineRevolutionanditsimpactonIndia

ASK AN EXPERT Dinesh asked: Given the present situation what should be India's foreign policy towards Iraq?

Sonia Roy replies: India and Iraq have always emphasised on their traditionally close political ties, especially since the 1970s. India and Iraq never had any hostility towards each other. The US-led invasion in 2003 and subsequent violence forced India to recall its ambassador in 2004. In March 2011, with improving internal situation following the 2010 elections, India has decided to resend its envoy to Baghdad. But at the same time, India opposed the US-led invasion.

Since 2003, India has contributed US$10 million towards the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), apart from providing training to Iraqi officials under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme. In addition it has committed US$20 million under the United Nations framework for assistance to the Iraqi people. The goodwill aid to Iraqi reconstruction, while refraining from interfering in its internal affairs, would be a good gesture of India’s friendly approach towards Iraq.

Since 2003, bilateral visits between the two countries have been rather limited. Iraqi Minister of Oil, Hussein Al Sharistani visited India in 2007 while the Iraqi Minister of Industry and Minerals Fauzi Franso Hariri came in 2010. There have been no reciprocal political visits to Iraq. India should look into improving political relations with Iraq and resume bilateral visits towards this end. Iraq is the third largest supplier of crude to India after Saudi Arabia and Iran and is slated to be world's biggest oil supplier by 2015. The re-construction opportunities are immensely beneficial for Indian companies. Also, the Indian government should tune its foreign policy, with emphasis on its historical ties to counter balance, or at least make a dent in China’s fast growing economic relations and the resultant influence in Iraq. With the stagnation of the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, it is in India’s interest to ensure unhindered energy supply from Iraq, and making it a strategic friend in the region.

Sonia Roy is pursuing research at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

idsa.in/askanexpert/IndiasforeignpolicytowardsIraq

REVISITING THE TA’IF ACCORD; IT’S AFFECT ON THE LEBANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS

Summary: The Lebanese Political System has been long associated with a consociational model of democracy, which Ardent Lijphart uses as a synonym to a Power-Sharing model. The National Pact of 1943 was an interim measure to overcome the divisions between Christian and Muslim leaders at the time of independence. It was hoped that eventually as the national spirit grew, the importance of confessionalism in the political structure would diminish. This so called temporary solution, however, due to its sensitivities of the population structure, was followed with a permanent effect. The Taif Accord of 1989 was a revision to that. This paper tries to revisit the Taif Accord, its stipulations, and study the changes as well as the problems associated with the same in the Lebanese society. It then tries to investigate if there has been any real reform to the Lebanese Political system, or is it just another modification to the same existing consociational model, of religious confessionalism.


INTRODUCTION

Till 1918, Lebanon was under the administrative rule and political sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. In 1920, the territory defined by the present-day boundaries became a state called “Grand – Liban” (Great Lebanon). This greater Lebanon included a mosaic of minorities, where the Maronites, the Sunni and the Shi’a sect of Islam formed the larger section within the existing communities. The state remained under French Mandate until November 26, 1941. A constitution was formally adopted on May 25, 1926 establishing a democratic republic with a parliamentary system of government. Effective political independence of the Republic occurred on November 22, 1943 (its Independence Day). In 1945 Lebanon became a founding member of the League of Arab states, and then it became a member of the United Nations.

Regarding its population structure, the last census that officially took place was in the year of 1932. Since the confessional system in place situated for political power sharing on the basis on population strength, it was natural that any change in the status quo as originated was met with strong protest from the communities at risk. In effect, today, we only arrive at unofficial ‘guess’ estimates regarding the present composition of population. The National pact of 1943 divided the seats according to the ratio of 6:5 in the parliament between the Christian and the Islamic sects. Lebanon acknowledges seventeen confessional groups, who are usually rendered political power in approximated percentages. Further, the President is to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister from the Sunni community, and the position of the Speaker would go to a Shi’a. Traditionally, the Deputy Speaker has always been a Greek Orthodox.

Another unique feature of this political system was the compromise they had reached between the indigenous Christian identities with that of the prevailing Arab-Islamic identity prevalent in the region. The Maronites and the other Christians volunteered to distance themselves from the western identification and accept the Arab face provided the Islamic sects in the state do the same. Needless to say, this remains a very sensitive issue as any closeness towards one or the other leads to the prevalence of a feeling of insecurity among the population. The first civil war is often interpreted as a reaction to Chamoun’s closeness with the western and French identification, which created a sense of insecurity among others.

A critical problem arose in its already sensitive population structure in the issue of immigration and absorption of refugees. The Armenian Massacre resulted in influx of Armenian Orthodox in the Lebanese society which was favourable to the existing Christian population there. However, the influx of the Palestinian Refugees, resultant of the wars with Israel, specifically the 1948 and 1967 wars, added with the Black September incident of 1970, caused for increasing Islamic population in the state. In such a situation, unlike Jordanians, these refugees were not incorporated unlike the erstwhile situation with the Armenians. Such intricacies cause for immense dissatisfaction throughout the Lebanese society. The Sunni’s and the Shi’a also claim that in time, there population has increased the 1932 census estimates and they actually form the political majority. In effect, they demanded the revision of the 6:5 ratios in Parliament. The Taif Accord was a revision to that effect, and today, the seats are divided equally among these two major communities. Still, the Islamic population remains dissatisfied asserting their claims which the Maronites and the Christian communities promptly decline to entertain.



THE CIVIL WARS IN LEBANON; THE ASSOCIATED POLITICAL BACKGOUND

Lebanon has seen a series of crisis and has been attributed with a longest running civil war. During the initial years of the Lebanese state, many saw it in the western face of the Arab world. Mercantile progress was however characterized by uneven development. While the urban location developed in leaps and bounds, the rural areas, mainly the Shi’a areas, remained undeveloped. The lopsided development was added with inefficient and crowded civic planning, where houses were built for the haves, while not much concern was relegated to the have-nots of the society. This disparity remained looming large.

The 1958 crisis was a relatively smaller one. One of the reasons for its eruption was the gradual disassociation by the ruler of the National Pact. Chamoun had always made a personal close association with the west while was not shy in expressing his displeasures at the Arab or the Islamic identification of the country. It was mainly caused by political and religious tensions in the country. It included a U.S. military intervention, leading to the easing of tensions. The civil war however, extended over a longer time frame. The scholars give varied reasons trying to explain the causation. Of few of the causes cited are the militarization of the Palestinian refugee population, with the arrival of the PLO guerrilla forces did spark an arms race amongst the different Lebanese political factions. In addition, the political ambitions of the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, who used the Palestinian cause to disrupt consensus amongst different Lebanese factions also contributed to the general chaos. Apart from the presence of the Palestinians, the stress caused by the confessional model power sharing was also a factor in the system collapse of the Lebanese society.

During the 1960s Lebanon was relatively calm. In the meanwhile, Fatah and other Palestinians groups had attempted to mount a coup in Jordan by incentivizing a split in the Jordanian army. The Jordanians responded and expelled the forces into Lebanon. This resulted in additional ‘armed’ Palestinian population in Lebanon. The Lebanese Sunni Muslims showed solidarity to the Palestinians, with the aim to change the political system from one of consensus amongst different ethnicities, towards one where their power share would increase. The Shi’a on the sidelines claimed there population has surpassed both the Sunni’s and the Maronites, demanding a revision in the National Pact. Among other incidents, the Sabra and Shatila Massacre resulted in the formation of Hezbollah, the Shi’a face of the Lebanese society with military affiliations and strong external linkages. The external actors like Syria and Iraq played havoc in the already trembling situation.

Between 1985 and 1989, sectarian conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Rashid Karami, head of a government of national unity set up after the failed peace efforts of 1984, was assassinated on June 1987. President Gemayel, before stepping down, appointed another Maronite Christian, Michel Aoun, as acting Prime Minister, contravening the National Pact. Muslim groups naturally rejected the violation of the National Pact and pledged support to Selim al-Hoss, a Sunni who had succeeded Karami. Lebanon was thus divided between a Christian military government in East Beirut and a civilian government in West Beirut.

The cause of the Lebanese civil war was neither exclusively internal nor exclusively external, nor is its settlement. The civil war came to an end at a specific historical juncture when movement toward internal reconciliation coincided with favourable regional and international developments. The Taif Agreement of 1989 brought the civil war into the process towards an end. In January of that year, Arab League formed a committee to formulate solutions to the conflict. This led to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Taif, Saudi Arabia, where they agreed to the national reconciliation accord in October. The agreement provided a large role for Syria in Lebanese affairs. Accordingly, in March 1991, parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. It was, however, not extended to crimes perpetrated against foreign diplomats or certain crimes referred by the cabinet to the Higher Judicial Council. In May 1991, the militias (with the important exception of Hezbollah) were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild themselves as Lebanon's only major non-sectarian institution.

THE NATIONAL PACT OF 1943: ITS LIMITATIONS

The National Pact of 1943 was an unwritten agreement that laid the foundation of Lebanon as a multi-confessional state, where negotiations between the Shi’a, Sunni and Maronite leaderships took shape to finally allowing Lebanon to have an independent existence. It was basically between President Bishara al-Khuri and Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh involving two major groupings: the political elite of the Maronites representing the Christians in general and the political elite of the Sunnis representing the Muslims. Among its provisions were the demands that the Maronites not to seek foreign intervention and accept Lebanon as an Arab affiliated country, instead of a Western one if the Muslims give up their aspirations to unite with Syria. The president would always be from the Maronite community, the Prime Minister a Sunni, while the speaker of the parliament would traditionally be a Shi’a. Also, added to these negotiated agreements, the seats of the National Parliament was to be divided in a ratio of 6:5, reflecting the census of 1932, along the confessional lines.

The constitution gave the Maronite president ultimate executive authority while not providing a mechanism for presidential accountability, especially since parliament could question the cabinet, but not the president. Moreover, in addition to the presidency, other key positions in government were held by Maronites. Members of this sect were to occupy major positions in key ministries, in the army and in the courts. Such positions included the commander-in-chief of the army, the highest Judicial position (President of the Court of Cassation), the positions of the Director-General of both internal security and intelligence and that of Governor of the Central Bank.

The confessional system's self-sustainability faces a problem in trying to give all religious groups proportional rights, but with incentives for national unity, because it assumes that citizens will always take sides with their confessional community. On this count, there are three main issues: reform of the political system, a national identity for Lebanon, and Lebanon's sovereignty. These are interdependent concept: Lebanon's sovereignty hinges on the whims of Damascus, national identity was shattered by civil war, and the confessional system created quotas for religious representation, failing to reflect the real change of religious ratios in the population bred volatility, frustrating the political majorities, who fear a reduction in their power, and the popular majorities, who want and demand for more political power.


THE TAIF ACCORD: ITS CHARACTERISTICS

The Taif Agreement, also known as the "National Reconciliation Accord” was an agreement reached to provide the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon. It was negotiated in Taif, Saudi Arabia by the surviving members of Lebanon's 1972 parliament, with its agreement covering political reform, the ending of the Civil War, the establishment of special relations between Lebanon and Syria, and a framework for the beginning of complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. This Accord restructured the political system in Lebanon by transferring some of the power away from the Maronite Christian community.

It was a compromise among the Lebanese deputies, political groups and parties, militias and leaders, tackling many essential points pertaining to the structure of the political system and to the sovereignty of the Lebanese state. The mechanism for regaining state sovereignty was preceded by an affirmation of the identity and unity of Lebanon. It was also preceded by internal political, administrative and other reforms. The Taif Agreement was a package deal. It constituted the right formula to end the war internally; however it was merely a process, not the end. In the Lebanese case one could not totally separate the internal aspects of the conflict from its regional dimensions. Consequently, the best solution was to preserve Lebanon as an entity and to introduce a new political and practical formula that would stop the war. This formula would also allow the Lebanese to regain a minimal degree of stability in order to rebuild their institutions, resuscitate their economy, and reinforce their capacity to face changing regional and international conditions.

As far as this Agreement was concerned, it was decisive in determining the Arab identity of Lebanon, emphasizing that Lebanon was an independent, sovereign, free country and a "final homeland" for all Lebanese. It, therefore, tried to uphold the national identity over communal leanings. This has been the initial goal of the National Pact, but with no success. Secondly, related to the previous point, it confirmed the unity of Lebanon.

Thirdly, it defined the nation's political system as a parliamentary democracy, based on the principles of separation, balance, and cooperation among the various branches of government. The Prime Minister, who was previously responsible to the Maronite President, was now responsible to the parliament. This would bring accountability in the government as well as help in reduce the political importance and power of the President, who being a Maronite, caused for domestic tensions among the other confessional groups in the Lebanese political system.

Fourth, it clearly defined the socio-economic system as a free economy favouring individual initiative and the right to private property. However, it also emphasized the necessity for balanced and even development in all the regions to insure a form of social equity. This was a commendable measure as in the previous years; the lopsided economic growth and development in society had resulted in wide disparity among its population composition. The Shi’a, for example, usually the rural-less economically developed class, suffered in the negative in such existing disparity, with no grievance mechanism from the central authority.

Fifth, its aim was at restoring the Lebanese sovereignty. It called for the disbandment of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and handling over their weapons to the Lebanese state within six months. Simultaneously, it called for the strengthening of the military and the Lebanese internal security forces. It also stated that the abolition of political sectarianism constitutes a basic national goal to be achieved according to a gradual scheme. The army, for instance, was modelled into a secular institution.


THE POST-TAIF LEBANON AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

At the time of negotiations at Taif, Saudi Arabia, a Maronite Christian, General Michel Aoun, had controversially been appointed by President Amine Gemayel as the Prime Minister, which was contrary to the set agreement traditionally followed under the National Pact. The Taif Agreement, as mentioned before while discussing its characteristic features, identified the abolition of political sectarianism as a national priority. However, it provided no timeframe for doing so. It was, in effect, a sort of open-ended provision The Chamber of Deputies was increased in size to 128 members, shared equally between Christians and Muslims, rather than elected by universal suffrage that would have provided a Muslim majority . A cabinet was established similarly divided equally between Christians and Muslims. The Prime Minister Michel Aoun refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Taif Accord, as he feared the dominance of Syria in its domestic affairs as a result. But under the President Elias Hraowi, the Taif regime in Lebanon was in place.

As far as the agreement is concerned, it basically left few issues out in the open to be deliberated upon in the future. One relates to the process of re- establishment of complete sovereignty in Lebanon. It was post this Accord when Lebanon joined the Madrid Peace Conference and later the bilateral negotiations with Israel. A related issue to this was the presence of the Syrian Troops, invited by the Lebanese government to restore peace and stability within its borders. This was, inspite of domestic opposition within Lebanon to such provisions, also a rationale the Israeli’s used to refuse to withdraw postponed a Syrian troop redeployment which had been written into the Taif Agreement. It was only in May 2000 when under the international ceasefire and legalities, Israel withdrew from the southern borders in accordance with the United Nations.

The larger issue was that of the nature of the internal political reforms and their implementation. The Taif Agreement introduced thirty-one important constitutional amendments which were approved by the Lebanese Parliament on August 21, 1990, and signed into law by President Elias al-Hraoui on September 21, 1990. While these reforms did not fundamentally alter the political structure , this Taif Agreement Implicitly ratified the National Pact of 1943 and emphasizes confessional compromise and inter-communal cooperation aiming at creating a new and more equitable confessional formula.

In the initial years of the implementation of the Agreement, the Lebanese agreed on the necessity of state revival, but they disagreed on the model that they should adopt. The Taif accord was a beacon to them, to reach some sort interim agreement so that it may be developed on and built upon on a later date. There was lot of internal debates, few of them till dare, on whether it had to be the traditional liberal model which existed before the war, the strong-state model, or a new model that would provide for both a sharing and concentration of power? This debate and contemplation has resulted in innumerable opinions and options, which are reflected far and wide on only in academia, but also in Opinion Pages of newspapers. The Agreement resulted in a reproduction of the Lebanese confessional state under a new formula. Sectarian balance and sectarian participation replaced one-sect hegemony, thus power became distributed centrally.
At the state level, the Agreement produced a troika consisting of the three Presidents: the President of the Republic, that of the Council of Ministers, and that of the Parliament. In practice, the understanding among these three presidents as individuals has come to mean that the three institutions, qua institutions, have paled in importance. This contradicts the fundamental purpose of the Agreement which was to replace the rule of the individual (the President) by the rule of the institutions. Furthermore, many different interpretations of the way to implement the Agreement have emerged. These differences result from the attempt of each President, as a representative of his confessional community, to enhance his position and his prerogatives. Moreover, the insistence of the President of the Republic to exercise many of the prerogatives that the Agreement has already cancelled represents an attempt to maintain some common unwritten practices in order to revitalize the old, pre-war system, thus curtailing the intent of the Taif Agreement through different practice. For instance, the insistence of the President of the Republic on attending, and thus presiding, over every meeting of the Council of Ministers in order to assert that he still has control over the executive power.
Yet, the most alarming consequence of the implementation of the Agreement has been the intensification of confessional conflicts and divisions leading to the paralysis of the political and administrative authorities. The disagreement on the appointment of the Grade One public posts has been an indication of such conflict. Wien some of these appointments were declared, they reflected a confessional distribution based on compromises that were based on neither competence nor expertise. The Taif state has not yet been able to establish a clear and relatively stable formula to rule, govern, and exercise authority. In addition to the previously mentioned problems, one can note the lack of new socio-political forces and leadership that can implement the Agreement fully, leading the nation towards a more democratic system.
The Lebanese state in the post-Taif era has been arbitrarily controlled by contradictory and conflicting socio- political forces. On the one hand, the militias that were dominant during the war years were invited and encouraged to participate in the political reformation process because they were considered to be representative of a reality that needs to be acknowledged first and gradually changed later. On the other hand, new socio-political forces foreign to the war forces came into power; they represent the economic power of local capital allied with regional capital, with important support from the rich and conservative Gulf states as well as that of European and American states. At the same time, the influence of the traditional confessional leaders greatly diminished during the war years, and this process continued in the Taif state.
The changes in the Lebanese system cannot be considered as due exclusively to changes of leaders. Exaggerating the role of the individual will not aid in understanding the Lebanese situation fully, neither its effects upon Lebanon's internal and external relations. In fact, an analysis of the new qualitative stage of development in the Taif state is necessary for the understanding of the current situation in Lebanon.

CONCLUSION
The Taif Accord can be blamed at having only reinforced the already existing confessional system, and creating even sharp divisions in society than before. Lebanese leaders were well aware that confessionalism was a major impediment to integration; a pragmatic solution was adopted, and it was hoped that people would unite as they learned to live together. Other provisions of the Taif Accord relating to Lebanon's external relations were more controversial. "Lebanon is Arab in belonging and in identity" is a stronger expression of Lebanon's "Arabness" than it was found in the 1943 National Pact and thus alarming some Christians. Syria was given a privileged position on matters relating to national security, thereby, effectively challenging the sovereignty of Lebanon in matters of independent policy making.

The Lebanese people themselves have come a long way. But the chief dilemma that surrounds their very identify is that of identity itself. Regarding this factor, the chief component in any deeply divided society lies in that, the particularistic identity often prevails over the overarching national identity. Lebanon is no exception. The Taif Accord may have brought the Christians and the Islamic population at the same ratio in the parliament, but the increasing demands by the Shites to have better representation, the Maronites dissatisfaction at losing a major component of power, points to the fact that even though they all belong to the National category of being Lebanese, the particularistic identity prevail as strong as ever. The problem arises when this particularistic identity comes in contradiction with the national one.

Overall, while revisiting the Taif Accord, what one finds ultimately are the same structures of the National Pact being inserted into the new, amidst some modification. The recent developments in Lebanon, not the subject matter concerned in this paper, only establishes the rising political role of the Shi’a and the Sunni, even Druze while a gradual diminishing of importance of the erstwhile Maronite community in the Lebanese Political society. It does not point towards an ultimate eradication of sectarian consciousness among the people. The confessional divisions remain.

END NOTES:

The National Pact of 1943 is an unwritten agreement which came into being in the summer of 1943 as the result of numerous meetings between Khuri (a Maronite), Lebanon's first president, and the first prime minister, Riyad as Sulh a Sunni. [http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/77.htm]

The reason for not incorporating the Palestinian Population is perhaps political. The usual argument amongst the Arab states prevail that this is done basically to capable the refugees to retain their identity as Palestinians and the support they all provide for the cause of the Palestinian State in the future. The Palestinians too, want to retain their national identity and hence do not look for assimilation in a favorable light inspite of stringent political reality.

David C. Gordon in his book ‘Lebanon: the Fragmented Nation ’, 1980, depicts in details the social and political inequality that existed in the Lebanese society during this period.

The Civil War in Lebanon stretched from 1975 and came to an official end only with the Taif Accord of 1989.

It was a conflict between Palestinian guerrilla organizations and King Hussein of Jordan that began in September 1970 and ended in July 1971 with the expulsion of the PLO to Lebanon, also known as ‘The Black September’.

Inspite of a vast literature pointing towards this effect, Mark Farha in his article ‘Democratic Dilemma’s’,
Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis, Edited by Barry Rubin concludes suggesting that the communities—Christians, Sunnis and the Shi’a’ are roughly equivalent.
An amnesty law is any law that retroactively exempts a select group of people, usually military leaders and government leaders, from criminal liability for crimes committed. Most allegations involve human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. In this case, it was the Hezbollah, who subsequently formed part of the Hariri government.

This was an important reform as Lebanon as a modern state has always been divided along sectarian lines, the national spirit always weak. The process of state building was complete, yet weak. The nation building was incomplete. It became a state with many nationalities. The army, previously reflecting that, was ineffective during the Civil War against the armed militia as the religious loyalty was strong. Professional army, non sectarian in basis is required for any society, especially such deeply divided ones like in the case of Lebanon.

The Taif Agreement introduced thirty-one important constitutional amendments which were approved by the Lebanese Parliament on August 21, 1990, and signed into law by President Elias al-Hraoui on September 21, 1990. The reforms did not fundamentally alter the political structure, which is still predicated on political sectarianism.

This however does not include the expatriate community, a majority of which is Christian.

The Syrians took over the Lebanese government apparatuses and brought their own proxies and yes-men to power, including clearly pro-Syrian presidents (Elias Hraowi, followed by Emil Lahoud), prime ministers and even Lebanese parliament deputies. Many held the opinion that Lebanon was slowly being formed into a Syrian Protectorate.

These are mentioned in details in an article by Hassan Krayem, ‘The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement’, American University of Beirut, [http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html] Accessed at 11 Feb 2010, 10:25 a.m.

It is still predicated on political sectarianism, only changing the responsibility of the Prime Minister to the Parliament, which was given few more powers while the powers of the President was reduced to some extend.

The Agreement stated that the abolition of confessionalism was a national goal, however, no specific deadline or time table was provided for its actualization


Bibliography:
1) Ahmed, A. N. (2000) ‘Lebanon’s Islamists and Local Politics: A New Reality’, Third World Quarterly, 21(5): 739-759
2) Barakat, H. ed. (1988), ‘Toward A Viable Nation’, Croom Helm
3) Collins, D. Ed. (1994), ‘Peace For Lebanon? From War To Reconstruction’, Boulder, Colorado.
4) Gordon, D. C (1980), Lebanon, The Fragmented Nation, The Hoover Institution Press, USA
5) Hudson, M.(1999), ‘Lebanon after Ta’if: another reform opportunity lost?- Ta’if Accord’, Arab Studies Quarterly,21(1): 27-38
6) Langohr, V. (2005), ‘Experiments in Multi-Ethnic and Multi-Religious Democracy’, Middle East Report, No. 237
7) Lijphart, A. (2004), ‘Constitutional Design for Divided Societies’, Journal of Democracy, 15(2):96-109
8) Maktabi, R. (1999), ‘The Lebanese Crisis of 1932 Revisited. Who are the Lebanese?’ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 26(2): 219-241
9) Michael W.(1967), ‘Political Parties In Lebanon – The Challenge of a fragmented Political Culture’, Cornell University Press.
10) Norton, A. R. (1991), ‘Lebanon after Ta’if: Is the Civil War over?’, Middle East Journal, 45(3): 466
11) O’Flynn, I and Russell, D (ed.) (2005), Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, Pluto Press, London
12) Pavlich, G. (1996), ‘The Power of Community Mediation’, Law & Society Review, 30(4): 703-733
13) Rubin, B. Ed. (2010), ‘Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict, and Crisis’, Palgrave Macmillan
14) Salem, P. (2006), ‘The Future Of Lebanon’, Foreign Affairs, 85(6): 13-22
15) Timothy S.(1996), ‘Power Sharing And International Mediation In Ethnic Conflicts’, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace

Changes in the Nature of US intervention in Latin America during the Cold War period and its Aftermath

Introduction:

US intervention in the Latin American Affairs is not a new phenomenon and could be traced back to the 19th century when the Latin American states started emerging as independent entities from their European colonial masters. What was important during this period was that the US itself was emerging as a new state with much less space and resources than it currently possesses. It started with the Monroe Doctrine of December 2, 1823 which propounded the idea of the Western Hemisphere where Latin America was implied to be the backyard of the US. Then it started a process of gradual territorial expansion since the first half of the 19th century through “manifest destiny” which continued till the early 20the century when the consolidated form of the present US emerged. This ideology was further boosted by acts like the Platt Amendment (1901) and Roosevelt Corollary (1904), which acted as boosters to US expansionist policies. Pope Atkins argues that during this period the US were guided by the twin objectives of a) excluding foreign influence from Latin America and b) promoting stability within it. After its consolidation the Mexico and the Circum Caribbean belt was increasingly looked upon by the US as important to its security and well-being with the result that these regions witnessed the largest number of armed US interventions (both direct and indirect) than the Southern Cone.
My enquiry in this paper began with the question as to whether the Nicaraguan Judgement of the ICJ in 1986 had any impact on the nature of US intervention in Latin America. Empirical evidence like the intervention in Panama (1989) and in Haiti (1992), subsequent to the judgement provides a negative response. But my contention is that although the US pulled out of the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the ICJ against the judgement, the verdict did change the nature of intervention in an indirect manner. This change was more perceptible after the democratization process of the 80’s and the 90’s in Latin America and the end of the Cold War which dissolved the ideological enemy before the US, often provided as a pretext to intervene. As the End of Cold War symbolized the superiority of Democratic norms and the US went on a ‘democratic drive’ itself, use of direct military means for intervening in the Latin America became politically incorrect. So increasing recourse was taken to what I would call ‘tension points’ to intervene in democratically elected countries.
This paper has been divided into four sections. The first section deals with the meaning of ‘intervention’ as provided by the UN Charter and also by the Nicaraguan Case (1986). The second gives a brief sketch of some leading US interventions in Latin America which was mostly coercive in nature. The third section discusses the change in the nature of intervention after the Post Cold War and the subsequent democratization process with special reference to tension points. And finally, the fourth would be an attempt at summarizing the debate by providing some critical insights.
1

Article 2 paragraph 4 of the UN Charter states that “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United nations”. Exception to this article is provided only by Article 51 of the Charter which calls for individual or collective self-defence and authorized by the UN Security Council. In the Nicaraguan Case of 1986 the US was caught on the wrong foot when the court “found the USA of breaching provisions of Customary International Law and intervening in the affairs of another state”. The Court further called for reparation to be made for al injuries caused (paragraph 13 of the judgement) and urged the USA to refrain from such acts which constitute a breach of its legal obligations (paragraph 12 of the judgement). This was a damning conviction of a major world power which was supposed to be acting “irresponsibly”. I would use this interpretation of the court to define “intervention” in this paper.
2

During the cold war and its immediate aftermath the US made four direct and many covert interventions in Latin America. Some of the important covert interventions were:
a) Operation P B Success (1953-54)
After his election in the early 50’s, Guatemala’s democratically elected President Arbenz Guzman instituted sweeping land reforms to benefit the country’s vast impoverished populance. As this involved appropriation of large farmland from Multinational companies, including the powerful United Fruits Company, US economic interest suffered which was given a political colour by depicting as intrusion of Communist ideology into the Hemisphere. Eisenhower, then, authorized the CIA to organise a coup which led to Arbenz’s ouster.
b) Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961)
Taking cue from Guatemala, Kennedy authorized the CIA to undertake a similar operation against Cuba’s Fidel Castro who came to power after disposing the Batista regime, and had since developed close ties with the Soviet Union. The force which constituted mostly of Cuban exiles landed in Southern Cuba on April 17, 1961. However this adventure resulted in failure as the Cubans were successful in repulsing back the attack.
c) Chile and Pinochet (1973)
In September 1973, Chile’s elected President Salvador Allende who had ties with Cuba’s Castro was overthrown by a military junta led by Augusto Pinochet. This coup was facilitated by the CIA.
d) The Contadora Initiative (1981)
This project was launched to counter the Sandinista government of Nicaragua which had an ultra let orientation. The US had two problems with the Sandinistas first, was their relation with

the Soviet Union and Second was their support to Salvadoran revolutionaries . This project continued till the end of the Cold war when the Sandinistas were thrown out of power through elections. What was unique about this project was that Nicaragua was able to drag the US into the ICJ and successfully argued for a hostile judgement in it.
Some of the important direct military interventions were:
a) Invasion of Grenada (1983)
In 1979, a revolution led by Maurice Bishop came to power with Cuban Support. An internal power struggle ensued resulting in the Bishop’s arrest and execution. 10,000 US, Jamaican and Caribbean troops landed on October 24, 1983 during the crisis.
b) Invasion of Panama (1989)
In December 1989, President Bush Sr. ordered a military invasion of Panama to arrest its President Manuel Noriega and overthrow his government who was accused of participating in drug trafficking. The operation led to thousands of civilian causalities.
c) Invasion of Haiti (1994)
In September 1994, Clinton ordered the US military to occupy Haiti and overthrow its Government and the flow of undocumented Haitians were cited as a reason for intervention. Establishing a Constitutional government the US argued would enable it to refuse asylees or refugees from Haiti.
Jorge Dominguez argues that during the Cold war the threat to the US interest in Latin America was mostly ideological than economic and was mostly guided by the ‘Cuban Threat’ after the Revolution of 1959.
3

Post Cold War US-Latin American relations can be explained in terms of ‘tension points’ which may be defined as “alliances forged by the US within elements in weak institutionalized or unstable Latin American countries so as to affect political outcomes favourable to it”. These points have been formed through two processes: 1) firstly, by strengthening the institution of the armed forces of the Latin American countries by providing training, equipping and facilitating financial resources, which would act as a check on policies of democratically elected governments and 2) secondly, by forging alliance within the political elites, either indoctrinated to its ideology or are favourable towards it, and supporting their claims within the political establishment through various covert means. This category also includes the role of epistemic communities within the weak countries who through a) their specialization b) their strong social networks and c) their ability to shape public opinion exerts tremendous influence on political elites in shaping political outcomes. Of the above two the later is specifically created to intervene in democratic set ups as it operates outside of public scrutiny. The combination of both these factors has led to a phenomenon which could be termed as ‘controlled democracies’ with the result that the decision making processes of the Latin American countries serve the interest of the US instead of their domestic electorate to who they are responsible and accountable.

Combined with these factors the US has identified new issue areas such as narco-trade, immigration, environment etc. to intervene in internal affairs of Latin American countries. As Jorge Castaneda argues that the evil (Soviet/Communist) empire to the east has given way to evil (drug producing/ immigration generating) slums of the south. Infact drug enforcement has led to highly intrusive form of cooperation, including US support for counter insurgency operation in Colombia . Peter Andreas points out that the threat from such non-traditional sources are perceived in the US to be so high that allocation made to Federal law enforcement agencies increased manifold during the period 1991-96 for fighting crimes emanating from the south. This he refers to as the rise of the ‘crime fare’ state as opposed to welfare state as allocation for fighting crime took place in a period of austerity when resources meant for other sectors like health, energy, education etc. took a backseat . And after 9/11, war on terror has been added to this swelling list.
4

The US is primarily concerned with ‘the realistic’ notion of solving problems which essentially implies the ‘problem solving approach to IR’. The main problem with this approach is its excessive emphasis on ‘presentism’ which in effect implies that problems are a creation of the present environment and has to be dealt only in the present context. Thus ahistoricity is deeply embedded into this approach. And in the Latin American scenario some of its basic problems are deeply rooted in the historical events of the past. For instance, if immigration is a security problem than what explains the mass migration of people from poor Latin American countries to the US? The problem solving could not provide any effective answer. Out of various causes, one of the plausible answer, if viewed from a historical perspective, is that successive governments in these countries has failed to bring about perceptible socio-economic changes mostly due to factors external to the country leading to formation of ‘an island of plenty in the midst of a sea of poverty’ which is why people migrate to ‘the Island’.
The epistemic communities in poor Latin American countries could be related to the role of intellectuals in Gramsci’s theory of Hegemony where “they perform the function of developing and sustaining the mental images, technologies and organisations which bind together the members of a class and of a historic block into a common identity” (Cox, 1993) leading to formation of institutions and ideologies which gets universalized among all sections of people . The fact that epistemic communities in the Latin American countries exist and have worked in favour of the US can be gauged from the observation made by Dos Santos:
“These countries have designed their development models to work internally and unilaterally opened up their economies to foreign capital, auctioned , privatized and denationalize important wealth source including water and bio-diversity, and increased their functional dependence on the United States” ( Dos Santos,2002) .



Bibliography:

1) Atkins, G Pope (1989), Latin America in the International Political System, Boulder, Sans Francisco & London, Westview Press

2) Dominguez, Jorge I. (1999), US-Latin American Relation during the Cold War and its Aftermath, Working Paper series 99-01, Harvard university

3) Castaneda, Jorge G. (1990), Latin America and the End of Cold War, World Policy Journal

4) Andreas, Peter (1997), “The Rise of the American Crimefare State”, World policy Journal

5) Cox, Robert (1993), Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations, in Stephen Gill (Ed), Gramsci Historical Materialism and International Relations, Toronto, Cambridge University Press

6) Salazar, Luis Suarez and Mariana Ortega Brena (2007), The New Pan – American Order: The Crisis and Reconstitution of the US System of Global Domination, Latin American Perspecteive

Author>: Jamini Buragohain
M.A. Fourth Semester
CPIS
School of International Studies

ARTICLE REVIEW

Diamond, Larry (2010), “Why are there no Arab Democracies?” Journal of Democracy, Volume 21, No.1, Twentieth Anniversary Issue.


Larry Diamond is senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University and director of Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. His books include The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies
Throughout the World (2008). He is founding coeditor of the Journal of Democracy.

This article opens up to a very conventional question, but with a not so conventional answer. The question of why democracy has not taken deep roots in the Arab speaking world of the Western Asian region has puzzled many with varied responses. The author uses a process of elimination, it rejecting the conventional rationale in explanation of the phenomenon, while forwarding his own explanation in why the democracy as a norm has not established itself in the Arab speaking world. This being the Twentieth Anniversary Issue of the journal, Diamond’s article is a contribution to the larger rubric of ‘Democracy’s Past and Future’.

Diamond rejects the religious and cultural explanations to the question at the very outset. Regarding religion, the work on Alfred Stephan and Graeme Robertson shows an Arab element rather than a Muslim one in the big ‘democracy gap’ among states in the world. India, with a substantial Muslim population, is a democracy. Diamond own analysis on this topic shows that at the end of 2008, the sixteen Arab states of Western Asia had an average score across the two Freedom House scales of 5.53 (the score of 7 signaling “least free”). The other thirty Muslim-majority states had an average freedom score of 4.7. Where culture is concerned, Iraq and Lebanon—for all their fractious, polarized divisions—are the two Arab countries closest to full electoral democracy today. This shows that ethnic or religious differences hardly pose a severe obstacle to democracy in the Arab world than they do in countries such as India, Indonesia, or South Africa.

He also categorically rejects economic development as a cause. He puts forward contrasting cases of Oil rich Gulf States, while the non-oil rich Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in reasserting the fact that, economic development as a variable again fails to predict the lack. The usual argument suggests that well to do country has a better chance in gaining and keeping democracy.
But in the Arab context, well to do Gulf States are also rentier economies, where there is the usual paradigm of no taxation, no representation. Therefore, the conclusion reached is that economic structure, but not necessarily growth is a contributing reason for the democracy deficit in the Arab World.

The author’s own explanation to this democracy deficit lies in two factors, involving political economy—as well as geopolitics. Regarding the Authoritarian tendencies, it is observed that ‘when pressure mounts, both from within the society and from outside, the regime loosens its constraints and allows more civic activity and a more open electoral arena—until political opposition appears as if it may grow too serious and effective’. This is today proved true in cases like Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab states across the region. Even if there is authoritarian rule in most of the region, it is not solely dependent on coercion, but the reality is much nuanced and adaptive to ground realities.

Regarding that of geopolitics, Diamond notes a two way process in maintaining the authoritarian and undemocratic elements in the Arab World. Apart from the economic structure where oil is found in abundance, these states also have the benefit of having the powerful states at their side. The erstwhile Soviet has been replaced by Britain and United States, but on the structural level, the crucial economic resources, security assistance, and political legitimacy provided by these external powers have remained the same. Two other external factors contribute to this deficit. First is the over-arching Arab Israeli conflict. Where the people cannot vent out there frustration on the corruption and human-rights abuses of Arab regimes, they are incited by these leaders to protest against the Israeli occupation and the plight of the Palestinians. This way, the popular public opinion is often swayed from the immediate realities to the larger Arab-Israeli conflict, diluting their specific anger and frustration into a wider arena. Also, another external factor is that of the other Arab states themselves, who reinforce one another in their authoritarianism, turning the Arab League into a select elite club.

The conclusive predictions which Diamond draws in 2010 are proved to be of much value in the upcoming witnessed situation in the coming year. He is skeptical of whether an indefinite future of authoritarian rule is the future of the region. He lays much stress on the importance of the new social-media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, the blogosphere, and the mobile-phone revolution, which indeed has been playing a part in the recent Arab uprisings in the region. He puts forward three hypotheses which could initiate the urge for democracy in the region. One is the emergence of a single democratic polity in the region, serving as a model to others. Second he sees the role of the U.S. policy to resume principled engagement and more extensive practical assistance to encourage and press for democratic reforms. Finally, he perceived the possibility of the global revolution in energy technology, breaking the oil cartel, as a factor which could end what he calls the ‘Arab political exceptionalism’.

The article is well researched, scholarly and is a vital contribution to the existing debate on the puzzling question of why Arab speaking states usually avoid the democratic aspirations. The article places its argument much on the structural sphere, where, while rejecting the other existing generalizations; some new generalizations are forwarded in its place. On the concluding hypotheses on what could spur the democracy demand in this region, the third remains highly futuristic, on the global revolution in the energy technology. The role of the Arab people themselves is very much subdued while analysing the possible democratic spurs the region may witness. However, his laid predictive emphasis on the new social media-tools in helping dialogue reach democracy has been proven undisputed in today’s terms.

WAR ON TERROR: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

The term ‘War on Terror’ was first declared by George W. Bush, the former President of United States on 20 September 2001 before a joint session of US Congress. He stated, "Our 'War on Terror' begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” What Bush did, in fact was to give a ‘global’ dimension to terror at large. A question naturally arises: how global is ‘globalized’ terrorism? Since 9/11, the Western countries focused their attention on ‘global terrorism’ and the ‘rogue states’ that support and or use it. Not much emphasis is put on terrorism at regional or national level. More often than not, national or regional terrorism is considered as nothing more than a local manifestation of global terrorism.

Several questions arose over this statement, time and again dissected, defended or discredited by all sections of the aware world, depending on which side of the wall they stood. Who is the target then? Is it one organization, or anybody the administration felt was sponsoring terrorists? What was to be the nature of this ‘global’ war? Was there a timeframe attached? What was the distinction between a state and a non state-actor that it is pursuing? Most of all, academicians, politicians and critiques raised one basic question, what was the definition of a ‘terrorist’ US was subscribing to?

The Al Qaeda is perceived to have a transnational aim as well as a being a transnational organization. Bush reasserted, “Every nation in every region now has a decision to make, either you are with us or with the terrorists”. “This is not just America’s fight alone. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight.” This is how terrorism has been ‘globalized’. The realist conception of ‘harmony of Interests’ has no clearer witness.
In this particular paper, a critical analysis on the ‘War on Terror’ is sought where different segments comprising this ‘War’ are looked at. I will divide my analysis in several thematic delineations namely;
• Definition of Terrorism, the persisting problem
• War on Terror, Rhetoric in West Asia
• State versus Non-State Terror
• War on Terror’s; Afghanistan to Iraq
• Human Rights concern
And summarize the overall impact this phenomenon has had on Western Asia and the rest of the world.

DEFINING A TERRORIST

Analysts may disagree on many aspects of the definition, but all converge on one point. There is no near universal accepted definition of the term and what is deemed a terrorist organization today is a constitutional entity tomorrow. The example of PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) would fit well in this particular respect. The dilemma in coining a consensual let alone a single definition to define ‘terrorism’ can be simply addressed by citing the two articles that was published in the ‘Economic and Political Weekly’. J. V. Despande notes that Achin Vanaik’s propositions on nuclear terrorism ('Nuclear Terrorism: A New Threshold?', January 26, 2002) lays more importance to ‘state terrorism’ as a greater menace to the mankind today than the terrorist acts of private, secret groups. Despande gives examples to show how terrorism ‘as practiced these days is not always a direct state activity. In some cases it is executed by proxy, using willing terrorist outfits as tools, a "mating of terrorist groups and a nation" as the US president (Bush) has described the phenomenon.’ He further argues, ‘Are not the states that actively sponsor terrorism of various groups as responsible for their actions as the terrorists themselves? Are these not instances of state terrorism?’ Vanaik then repeatedly addresses the point stating, ‘All regimes in some way or the other invoke terror and one could so easily fall into the unhelpful posture of calling all or most all regimes or states or countries terrorist in one way or the other. I believe it is far better, therefore, to make a distinction between terrorist regimes and democratic ones, which by definition are not terrorist governments or states but do and can carry out terrorist acts and campaigns internationally and at times domestically’

On a different angle, Charles Tilly observed, “No useful generalization covers all the different sorts of political interaction for which observers, analysts, and participants sometimes use the term terror, much less for terrorists and terrorism. But we can identify some order in the phenomenon by means of four steps: (1) noticing that a recurrent strategy of intimidation occurs widely in contentious politics and corresponds approximately to what many people mean by terror; (2) recognizing that a wide variety of individuals, groups, and networks sometimes employ that strategy; (3) relating the strategy systematically to other forms of political struggle proceeding in the same settings and populations; and (4) seeing that specialists in coercion ranging from government employees to bandits sometimes deploy terror under certain political circumstances, usually with far more devastating effects than the terror operations of nonspecialists.” He further elaborates on the ways in which ‘terror’ has been used as a strategy, its multiple uses for varied and differentiated ends. By large, he confirms that it would be an act of terror only when the end is in a specific, though not necessarily, political cause (Tilly, 2004)

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell stated in May 2002: "In this global campaign against terrorism, no country has the luxury of remaining on the sidelines. There are no sidelines. Terrorists respect no limits, geographic or moral. The frontlines are everywhere and the stakes are high. Terrorism not only kills people. It also threatens democratic institutions, undermines economies, and destabilizes regions”. Even with a lack of clarity in the definitional term, a clear warning was dotted out to all states to stand against these ‘terrorist’ elements.


WAR ON TERROR: CHANGING RHETORIC IN THE REGION

The region of West Asia is often quoted as the most conflict prone area in the world. Conflicts of every flavor and kind can be found having a place in this region. However, as complex interdependence presupposes, no region can be in isolation from its global impact. The War on Terror, with its global impact, had a dent in all parts of the world. Where this region is concerned, the War on Terror had, however a direct and deliberate impact on the region.

President Bush in his famous State of the Union Address of 29 January, 2002 identified three countries with the label of Axis of Evil . North Korea apart, Iran and Iraq both fell in this region of West Asia. In May 6, 2002 John R. Bolton, who served as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations from August 2005 until December 2006, gave a speech entitled "Beyond the Axis of Evil". In it he added three more nations to be grouped with the already mentioned rogue states: Libya, Syria, and Cuba. The criteria for inclusion in this grouping were: "state sponsors of terrorism that are pursuing or who have the potential to pursue weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or have the capability to do so in violation of their treaty obligations" . The speech was widely reported as an expansion of the original axis of evil. This way, Syria also joined the terror ambit along with Iraq and Iran.

This rhetoric was continued in Canada on 1 December 2004, where Bush detailed his foreign policy objectives for his next term. First, he would build and rebuild international coalitions. This was perhaps the obvious outcome of the world criticism he had received due to his unilateral measures in Afghanistan and the deliberate misinterpretation of UNSCR 1441(2002) . Secondly, he would pursue vigorously the war on terrorism. Third, he would enhance “our own security by promoting freedom and hope and democracy in the broader Middle East.” Bush went out of his presidency widely criticized by both the world, as well as within the domestic constituency in America.

President Obama’s Administration however sees a more carefully drafted and nuanced approach to the War on Terror. In March 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the Obama administration had stopped using the Bush-era War on Terror terminology. But coming up with an alternative phrase has proven difficult. The Obama administration reportedly tried to substitute "Overseas Contingency Operation," but quickly dropped this, as it did not hold well with the media. More recently, it has begun referring to its efforts as "Countering Violent Extremism," or CVE. However, the term War on Terror, even with its negative connotations, remains identifiable for the ongoing struggle between the United States and its allies on the one hand and al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist movements and governments on the other. In June 2009, Obama clearly tried to delink Islam from Terrorism in order to improve US image in the Arab and the greater Islamic world in his landmark Cairo Speech. He started moving away from force to deliberation in order to achieve ends. President Obama has deliberately avoided a terrorism-centric approach and attempted to redefine and renew ties with West Asia based on “mutual respect.” His administration made a strategic decision to elevate Arab-Israeli peace as an overriding priority of U.S.-Mideast policy, recognizing the centrality of Palestine in Arab grievances toward the United States. Accordingly, American policymakers are now less interested in putting pressure on autocratic allies, whose support is seen as necessary for progress on the peace process.

STATE VERSUS NON-STATE TERROR

State Terrorism is where a government terrorizes its own population to control or repress them. These actions usually constitute the acknowledged policy of the government, and make use of official institutions such as the judiciary, police, military, and other government agencies. Saddam Hussein using chemical weapons on his own Kurdish population during the Gulf War is an example of State Terrorism. Another form commonly seen is State Sponsored Terrorism. The United States government has been the subject of accusations of state terrorism by many groups and individuals, including historians, political theorists, government officials, and others. These accusations also include arguments that the US has funded, trained, and harbored individuals or groups who engaged in terrorism. The states in which the U.S. has allegedly conducted or supported terror operations include the Philippines, Cuba, Chile, Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Japan, Nicaragua, and Vietnam, along with its historic internal operations against Native Americans. Another example could be that of state sponsorship is the Syrian government's support of Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Non-State terrorism on the other hand comprise of a wider arena of all non state actors that promote or help in promoting terrorism. Non-conventional means are not essential to total terrorism, but they would certainly facilitate it by greatly increasing the lethality and terror of attacks by non-state actors. To deal with such a changing milieu, the United Nations has more widely focused on this issue and the First, Third and the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly along with other specified organs of the UN has redefined and broadened the definitional understanding to include the Non State elements.

West Asia occupies a unique place in perceptions regarding the risk of terrorism by non-conventional means, and especially the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. The fact that weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, have been widely employed in the region, suggests an erosion of strategic taboos that remain in place elsewhere. In general, the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the region has come in the context of conventional conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars. Today, the proliferation of terrorist organizations like the Hamas, Hezbollah, and the growing right wing strength in Israel is added to Syria sponsoring Hezbollah in Lebanon and the recent going-Nuclear Iran which increases the fear of a case where weapons or worse, technology would be available to people with Terrorist tendencies. Such a catastrophe would impact the whole globe in the worse possible way.

THE WAR ON TERROR: FROM AFGHANISTAN TO IRAQ

The War on Afghanistan began on 7 October, 2001. The first phase of the war was the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, when the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom, which they claimed, had the goal of "removing the safe haven to Al-Qaeda and its use of the Afghan territory as a base of operations for anti-U.S. terrorist activities. Under the auspicious of The War on Terror, Osama bin Laden and other high-ranking Al-Qaeda members were to be put on trial, to destroy the organization of Al-Qaeda, and to remove the Taliban regime which supported and gave safe harbor to it. United Nations Security Council did not authorize the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan. However, the Bush Administration and its supporters maintained the invasion to be an act of collective self-defense provided for under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and therefore not a war of aggression.

The war on Afghanistan was strictly seen by the lenses of terror. Both Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime were seen as the continuous face of impending insecurity in the world. The sympathy of the world was with President Bush when he launched a war. More than seeing this war as against terror, it was seen as being retaliation for the 9/11. Even if the war entered at was largely questioned by the International Community, sympathy for USA won over.

However, the Iraq Syndrome finds itself on quite another plain. The critic often point out that is the War on Iraq was less a War against Terror, more of an Oil Conspiracy? Regime change in Iraq was always a goal of American foreign policy. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was strongly opposed by some traditional US allies, like France, Germany, New Zealand, and Canada. The argument was that there was no evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that invading the country was not justified in the context of UNMOVIC's February 12, 2003 report . On February 2003, the IAEA failed to find any evidence of any WMD or nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. However, USA and the ‘coalition of the willing’ invaded Iraq on 20 March, 2003 inspite of wide protest both at the legal as well as the political level world wide.

The Invasion of Iraq resulted in the loss of focus for the US Foreign Policy goal of War on Terror. Some critics of the war, particularly within the U.S. military community, argued that with the war on Iraq and the war on Terror has drifted apart, and criticized Bush for losing focus on the more important objective of fighting al-Qaeda. This war has lead to complete collapse of Iraqi State machinery, and a study of the US State Government Religious Freedom Report, to take an example, would show undeniably, the real life situation of all sections of society. Refugees and IDPs have created yet another problem. Then there is the issue of the War Crimes.

Hence, the common conception remain, the stage has shifted drastically from ideals established in the initial call for the War on Terror. The Iraq War has shown less of combating terror and more of a hypocritical face of USA interest in the region. The Terror has lost its luster, as the Obama Administration tried to change the very term by using Overseas Contingency Operation, but this new term was not as receptive to the public likes.

HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN

Laws like that of Arbitrary Detention are a small part of the variety of instances one can pull out of the box which violates human right and human dignity, as a measure to the need of time. In the case of International system, where there is anarchy, bodies like the United Nations and other functional Organizations and the presence of International Law try to maintain a semblance of order among states. The War on Terror spoke of a global action course where no terrorist would be left alone. Suggestively, many critics and observers have called it a never-ending war as it is simply not possible to pick and target terror and end it. Terror is not identifiable in a person or institution, but rather, it is a phenomenon with a strong negative connotation attached to it. The War on Terror as suggested by the Bush Administration, in its substance, would be a never ending war ongoing for generations, something no state, however powerful, can afford to invest in.

The Berlin Declaration of the International Commission of Jurists, August 2004 stated, “Since September 2001 many states have adopted new counter-terrorism measures that are in breach of their international obligations. In some countries the post- September climate of insecurity has been exploited to justify long-standing human rights violations carried out in the name of national security.” The Secretary General (Kofi Anan) had been unequivocal in the affirmation of defense of human rights. On 18 January 2002 he said, “We should all be clear that there is no trade-off between effective action against terrorism and the protection of human rights. On the contrary I believe that in the long term we shall find that human rights, along with democracy and social justice are one of the best prophylactics against terrorism.” Taliban and Al Qaida suspects are held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba without the protection either of international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The US Administration stated that provisions in Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war do not apply to these detainees. And so those protections have been violated. Detainees had been denied the protection of rights guaranteed under the US constitution and the US courts have refused to intervene for a long time. They were held in inhumane conditions, subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment and perhaps torture and denied due process rights, including the right to legal advice and representation and the right to be charged and tried openly before an independent tribunal. It was only recently, that President Obama called this a "sad chapter in American history." The promised closure of the Bay is still an impending process.

The US PATRIOT Act is one such domestic measure even in a democratic country like the USA which had serious repercussions. The Act reduced restrictions on law enforcement agencies' ability to search telephone, e-mail communications, medical, financial, and other records; eased restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States; expanded the Secretary of the Treasury’s authority to regulate financial transactions, particularly those involving foreign individuals and entities; and broadened the discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism-related acts. The act also expanded the definition of terrorism to include domestic terrorism, thus enlarging the number of activities to which the USA PATRIOT Act’s expanded law enforcement powers could be applied.


CONCLUSION

In the concluding analysis, what seems as a US policy to combat terror, a noble approach at face value, has actually opened a Pandora’s Box. There is immense literature in International Relations and Legal discourse on a steady rise tying to link and delink war and ethics, and some questioning this very linkage. The War on Terror can be a case study to the same. Terror has been demonized under its purview even without a clear definition to identify it. The danger lies in the fact that with no clear explanation for what one means by a particular term, the strong can always manipulate. Many have pointed out the term ‘Axis of Evil’ having the same tendencies.

It is undeniable that the world before 9/11 was not peaceful but the declaration of the War on Terror, specifically identifying Al Qaeda, has both a positive and a negative point. It made the world aware of such nexus that held an element of threat to lives to every person. Governments by large has volunteered to participate in this international event by obliging themselves to conventions and treaties. Awareness is a great boon. But on the negative, the importance bestowed on Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, bought them greater popularity than they would have attained under normal means. The exposure of such elements saw a greater and more frequent organization of terror outfits, using Jihad or religious elements as a guise.

Another aspect that I deem extremely negative related to the War on Terror, is that, the demonization of a particular religion that it sought. It was more primarily the former President of USA and his policy makers who had to be held responsible, but too much stress on Islamic Terrorism, so much so that it has come to mean Islam equating with terrorism, could serve no government in the long run. A whole religion against the world will lead to only more conflict. Even when Obama tried to delink the two (like in the Cairo Speech) recognizing the importance of the Islamic Civilization to the world, his election campaign and henceforth deliberate acts trying to disassociate himself (his name) with Islam, only reasserts this negative image.

The critical analysis sought in this paper merely tries to touch certain aspects I deemed personally important, while leaving behind a whole gambit of issues completely unidentified. This would only reassert my point that the War on Terror has its impact so vast that its effects have been felt on the world, in more than one ways. Also, such an event has marked its own chapter in its own right in the historical discourse.

[Words: 3566]








REFERENCES:

BOOKS:

1. Paul Rogers, ‘Iraq and the War on Terror: Twelve months of insurgency’, I.B.Tauris, 2006
2. Tareq Y. Ismael, William W. Haddad edited, ‘Iraq: The human cost of History’, Pluto Press, London 2004
3. Ninan Koshy, ‘The War on Terror, Reordering the World’, Left World, India 2002
4. Kanti S. Bajpai, ‘The roots of Terrorism’, Penguin, India 2002
5. Rohan Gunaratna, ‘ Inside Al Qaeda: A global network of Terror’, Lotus-Roli Books Pvt. Ltd, Fourth Impression 2009
6. Rashid Khalidi, ‘Resurrecting Empire- Western Footprints and American Perilous Path in the Middle East’, I.B. Tauris, UK, 2002
7. Milan Rai, ‘War Plan Iraq’, Verso, London 2002

ARTICLES:

1. J. V. Despande, ‘Nuclear Terrorism and All That’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 14 (Apr. 6-12, 2002), pp. 1370-1371
2. Achin Vanaik, ‘Definition and Ethics’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 40 (Oct. 5-11, 2002), pp. 4164-4168
3. Charles Tilly, ‘Terror, Terrorist, Terrorism’, Sociological Theory, Vol. 22, No. 1, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium (Mar., 2004), pp. 5-13 Published by: American Sociological Association
4. Rama Sampath Kumar, ‘Impact of US-Led War on Terrorism’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 33 (Aug. 17-23, 2002), pp. 3414-3419
5. Andrew T. Parasiliti, ‘The Causes and Timing’s of Iraq War: A Power Cycle Assessment’, International Political Science Review, Vol 24, No. 1, 2003
6. Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism’, American Anthropologist, 2002
7. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, ‘After 9/11: Is it All Different Now?’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution’, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2005
8. Neal K. Katyal and Laurence H. Tribe, ‘Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111, No. 6 (Apr., 2002)
9. Patricia M. Wald, ‘International Criminal Courts: Some Kudos and Concerns’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 150, No. 2 (Jun., 2006)